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Summary
Passwords have been dominating user authentication for more than half a century,
and many researchers believe that they will continue as a key part of the user
authentication world in the foreseeable future. The well-known usability-security
problem of textual passwords, i.e., the difficulty for human users to choose strong and
easy-to-remember passwords, has received a considerable attention over many years.
Many alternative solutions have been proposed to replace textual passwords, however,
none of them can keep all advantages of textual passwords without bringing new
problems. As a consequence, hybrid user authentication systems such as multi-factor
authentication (MFA) has been widely suggested for security-critical applications
such as e-banking systems. Such hybrid user authentication systems normally
lead to higher usability costs, so are not ideal solutions for all applications. The
hybrid nature also means organizations and service providers have to deploy and
maintain different user authentication components, thus making reconfiguration of
such systems more complicated.
This thesis looks at several less-studies but still important areas of user authentication:
how human users perceive objective ratings given by computer programs such as
proactive password checkers (PPCs) and subjective ratings given by human experts,
how human users can be better educated about password security, and how we can
overcome the current drawbacks of hybrid user authentication systems to improve
user experience and enhance reconfigurability of such systems. Our research led to
some new insights on how human users perceive password strength ratings, a new
password security education tool, and a novel “all in one” and backward compatible
user authentication framework.
For the first work, we conducted a user study with over 1,000 crowdsourcing workers
to gather information about how they perceived their trusts on objective and
subjective ratings of a number of given passwords. The results shed light on the
influence of personalization and contextualization on users’ perceived trusts on
password ratings, implying human users’ decisions on textual passwords depend
on highly on their personal characteristics, individual passwords and their own
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subjective judgments on given passwords. We observed several typical behavioral
patterns in terms of human users’ perceived trust on subjective and objective ratings.
These findings can help support better designs of PPCs and other password security
tools.
One finding of the above-mentioned user study is that many human users clearly
trusted their own subjective judgments more than ratings given by others. This
suggests better password educational tools are needed to help human users make
better subjective judgments on password strength. We noticed PPCs have a natural
side effect of educating users, but this effect has not been well studied and most
designs are not optimal in terms of password security education. We therefore
proposed Password Security Visualizer (PSV), an interactive visualization system
specifically designed for password security education. PSV can provide many new
features that do not exist in traditional PPCs, thus having a greater potential to
achieve its goals of educating users. A 2-D prototype of PSV was implemented, and
a number of user studies were conducted to investigate its performance as both a
PPC and a password security education tool. The results showed that PSV was
considered the most informative and recommended by most participants as a good
educational tool.
The personalization effect observed in our user studies on passwords led us to consider
how we can generalize existing user authentication framework to allow personalization
beyond textual passwords. This led us to discover Pass∞, a novel “all in one” and
backward compatible framework which can support all four authentication factors
(knowledge-based, token-based, biometric-based and context-aware authentication)
and many different schemes in each factor. Pass∞ enables users to freely combine
diverse authentication actions while keeping compatibility with textual passwords so
that a user can continue to use his/her old textual password even after Pass∞ is
introduced. The diversity of different authentication actions supported by Pass∞
can help users to personalize their individual choices of passwords to reach a better
trade-off between security and usability: a human user can define his/her password
as a sequence of simple authentication actions that can be easily remembered, and
Pass∞ will convert the simple hybrid password into a much more complicated
password that a password cracker will find very difficult to guess. Being able to
support many different user authentication actions in a single framework also helps
make Pass∞ highly reconfigurable, e.g., different password policies can be defined for
different user groups to allow different types of combinations of user authentication
actions. A prototype of Pass∞ prototype was implemented which will be tested in a
number of user studies we plan to conduct in near future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The rapid proliferation of computer technology has created an urgent need to protect
information assets from theft. Therefore, authentication mechanisms are fundamental
for allowing only for authorized access. Despite being older than half a century,
textual passwords remain the mostly-used form for user authentication, which can be
attributed to their simplicity (ease to use) and cost effectiveness. Many researchers
believe that they will continue as a key part of the user authentication world in the
foreseeable future, despite many security and usability problems identified and a
large number of new user authentication systems proposed over the years [4, 5].
Because the widespread use of passwords, they are frequently targeted in cyber
attacks and many large-scale password leakage incidents have been reported especially
in recent years [6, 7]. Figure 1.1 shows the recent data breach over the past four
years, including the size of the password leakage. Some of these leaked passwords
are not stored in clear to provide more protection on passwords stored on the server
side. Password strengthening technologies such as password hashing and salting
have been developed for this purpose. Nevertheless, human users remain a weak link
because they often choose weak passwords to compromise security for usability, thus
making password cracking much more effective [8–13].
The above usability and security problem of passwords is further worsened by the
fact that human users normally have many passwords to use across many different
computing devices and online services. Consequently, the reuse of passwords has
become a trend by many people to reduce the memory burden [14, 15], risking their
accounts’ security when one account data is breached [12]. Besides, individuals would
probably start writing their passwords on paper, making them prone to physical
access of unauthorized people such as relatives and colleagues.
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Figure 1.1: Chart of the world’s largest data breaches that occurred in the last four
years [1]. The data highlighted in pink is password related breaches.
In order to avoid the use of weak passwords by humans, many technologies have
been developed. Some of them focus on finding an alternative solution (such as the
use of graphics, tokens or biometrics for user authentication) to passwords as an
attempt to reduce the memory burden associated with strong passwords. In contrast,
other technologies aim to assist users and network administrators in an effort to
influence and regulate users’ decisions towards better passwords. Password checkers
and password policies are among the most widely-used technologies for this purpose.
Although all existing technologies can help to mitigate the problem, almost all of
them have still some important limitations (which will be discussed in Chapter 2).
In this thesis, we look at how to develop better approaches beyond password checkers,
and report our work on a number of studies ranging from human users’ perceived
trust on password strength ratings, to a better password security education tool
and a new framework for designing and implementing user authentication systems
going beyond passwords and multi-factor authentication (MFA). This is explained
more in the next two sections which summarize our objectives and contributions,
respectively.
2
1.2 Objectives
Here, we summarize the main objectives of this doctoral thesis.
• To achieve a better understanding of human behaviors in user authentication
processes, focusing on the role of password strength ratings to see how they
are perceived by human users to make decisions on their password choices.
• To design and implement better tools to educate human users about password
security so that they are more informed when making decisions on passwords.
• To develop a user authentication framework to provide a better trade-off
between security and usability than passwords and other alternative solutions,
for both human users, organizations and service providers.
1.3 Contributions
My contributions can be summarized into the following points:
• A background review is given to gain better understanding of the current issues
on passwords and research efforts towards solving these issues (Chapter 2). We
found that it is likely users’ security attitude and behavior is a result of their
type of personalty and characteristics. Moreover, there is an apparent lack of
taking human differences into consideration in the current efforts on advising
users and improving interfaces to engage users towards a better decision on
password.
• To better understand users, user perception of trust on the subjective and
objective ratings of password strength was studied (Chapter 3). The study
involved over 1000 participants and shows that user personality has a great
impact on user choice of trust. The results indicated that user decision could be
also influenced by other factors. Some factors are attributed to their previous
background knowledge while some others are attributed to the given context
or environment. In terms of context, the results showed that some users still
need objective solutions to make a better decision, especially if there is a lack
of knowledge.
• Moving towards developing better beyond password checkers, we proposed
Password Security Visualizer (PSV) (Chapter 4), which is an interactive
visualization system specifically designed for password security education.
PSV supports visualizing different proactive password checkers (PPCs) and
password security information, allowing it to be used like a “many in one” or
“hybrid” PPC. The aim is to make users become aware of divers aspects related
to password security. Then, we developed a PSV prototype based on PPCs in
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which users are supported with rich information on the security of password of
their choice via an open interface. One important feature is that PSV can be
tailored to satisfy user demands. Through a semi-structured interview based
on a number of testing sessions with 20 participants, the usefulness of the PSV
prototype was evaluated. PSV was considered to be the most educative tools
comparing to three traditional types of PPCs1. However, PSV was discovered
to be not a good alternative PPC because of the lack of direct password
strength estimation and straightforward instructions for improving passwords.
Similar results on users’ perception were highlighted in this study. The result
revealed that most participants found PPCs useful, but their perceptions vary
on what PPC is preferred and when they follow the ratings of a PPC.
• Moving towards developing better beyond passwords and multi-factor authen-
tication (MFA), we proposed a Pass∞, a framework for user authentication
(see Chapter 5). The framework empowers users and/or service providers to
adapt more personalized and universal authentication solutions to enhance
password security. In other words, it enables users to have free combinations of
diverse authentication actions. We provide some discussion on how the main
four authentication factors can be implemented without changing the existing
password systems. We also implemented a Pass∞ prototype and provide a
number of future works.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter provides a comprehensive review of literature related to our work. This
chapter is divided into eight sections. In section 2.1, existing user authentication
solutions are reviewed. Section 2.2 provides some background needed to understand
the tradeoff between usability and security associated with passwords. Section 2.3
and Section 2.4 review threat models around passwords, and cracking methods,
respectively. In following three sections, other related methods around password se-
curity are discussed, including password strengthening algorithms, password strength
meters and password checkers. In Section 2.8, we discuss a separate topic on empirical
user studies methods that are needed in future chapters.
Chapter 3 describes the influence of subjective and objective ratings on user
decisions. The chapter is organized as follows. The chapter starts with some
introduction to the work, which is followed by a discussion of some related work.
1One of the PPCs is based on the most common 1-D color bar design. The second PPC is based
on multi-bar design, revealing more information on the used criteria for estimating the password
strength. The last PPC is based on an interactive fear appeal PPC design. For more details see
Section 4.4.2
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Then, we provide a detailed description of our user study design and data analysis.
The last section draws a conclusion and discuses our future work.
Chapter 4 presents a password strength visualizer (PSV) to educate users on
password security. This chapter is arranged as follows. First, we gave a brief
introduction of PSV. Then, we provide some discussion on our design considerations
of PSV. Next, details on the web-based PSV prototype system are given. Afterwards,
our conducted user studies are explained. Finally, we conclude the chapter with
further discussions and future work.
Chapter 5 discusses Pass∞, a framework for user authentication. First, a brief
introduction of the Pass∞ is given. Next, the implemented prototype of the Pass∞ is
discussed. Then, future user studies on our prototype are given. Finally, conclusion
and our forthcoming work are presented.
Chapter 6 summarizes and discusses our future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter presents various research sub-domains related to our work. At the
beginning, we review existing user authentication solutions. Then, we provide some
background needed to understand usability issues associated with passwords. This is
followed by reviewing threat models around passwords, and cracking methods. Then,
other related techniques around password security, including password strengthening
algorithms, password strength meters and password checkers, which will lay the
foundation of our work are detailed in the next three sections. The last section
presents a separate topic on how to run empirical user studies for password security
and usability, that are needed in future chapters.
2.1 User Authentication
User authentication is the process of verifying the credibility of users to grant access
to systems or resources. Bonneau defined the authentication as a protocol between
a prover, such as a user, requesting access to a system via a password, and a verifier
requesting proof, such as a server [16]. The verifier sends a particular challenge like
a question to the prover. The prover responds by providing the password. To avoid
an eavesdrop attack, multiple challenges must be given and each password must
be marked with its challenge via executing some function. The function value of
challenge-password pair is known as a one-time password.
From the above model, several special cases of authentication can be identified.
Authentication techniques can be classified into four authentication factors based
on “what you know”, “what you have”, “who you are”, and “where you are”. The
combination of two or more than one factor refers to more advanced authentication
techniques, known as multi-factor authentication (MFA). In this section, an overview
of authentication mechanisms under each of the four categories is provided.
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2.1.1 Knowledge-based authentication
Knowledge-based authentication mechanisms involve verifying a shared secret be-
tween a prover and a verifier as proof of identity. Accordingly, the shared secret can
be varied, as the knowledge is unlimited. One might use the term of “password” to
denote any secret knowledge, including a textual string (for normal textual pass-
words), a number of pictures, a number of points, a number of strokes on a grid,
a number of actions, etc. Thus, the knowledge-based authentication systems can
be classified based on the “password” format. Throughout this thesis, when clarity
is needed to indicate a specific secret knowledge, the term password will be used
with an adjective, such as a text password to refer a typical password and graphical
password to denote a password which is an image.
Some basic knowledge-based authentication schemes such as the normal textual
password, a single static challenge asking for a password is shown and the prover
provides it directly. In others, multiple static challenges can be shown for each
prover, like a personal knowledge question. In still other schemes, the challenge is
dynamic for each authentication attempt, and this is called a nonce, time-stamp or
counter.
Nevertheless, knowledge-based authentication techniques can be classified based
on three memory retrieval techniques 1, which can be applied in knowledge-based
authentication schemes with respect to the type of password in use, as described
below.
1. The uncued recall-based technique is where the system depends on users to
memorize their passwords without any help. This might work properly with
meaningful passwords.
2. The cued recall-based technique is where the system gives a cue to help users
to extract the password from their memory. This technique is considered to
be easier than uncued recall.
3. The recognition-based technique is a special type of cued recall technique
where users have to recognize the password amongst a set of other incorrect
secrets.
Authentication systems can be also classified based on the format of the shared
secret. This section discusses some examples of authentication systems following the
format classification of the shared secret.
1This categorization was originally proposed for graphical passwords but they can be generalized
to other types of passwords as well. This categorizations on the process of the whole password
system rather than the format of passwords.
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Textual Passwords
In these systems, the format of shared secret is text password which is a sequence of
characters including letters, digits and symbols.
Normal text-based scheme: This is the most common and simplest authenti-
cation method. The static challenge-response protocol is applied here, where the
system asks the user to provide the password at the authentication stage. Thus, user
needs to enter a textual password as a response in order to authenticate themselves.
The implementation of this method is very easy, as well as being easy to use and
learn. In terms of deployability, textual-based authentication is vastly superior to
the other authentication schemes [4].
As mentioned in Chapter 1, despite the widespread use of textual passwords, users
choice of passwords poses a well-known security/usability dilemma. Theoretically,
passwords can be very strong and secure when they are long enough, and consist
of a combination of random uppercase and lowercase letters, digits and special
characters [17]. However, such passwords are less likely to be chosen by humans since
they are normally harder to memorize. Hence, users habitually abandon choosing
tough passwords, making their passwords more vulnerable to dictionary and brute
force attacks (see Section 2.2 for further discussion).
Later, passphrase was proposed as an attempt to enhance password security with
similar user experience. A passphrase is a special type of long password that consists
of a combination of multiple words, which may form a sentence. From a certain point
of view, the length of the passphrase may increase the resistance to brute force attacks.
However, this might be not true for other types of password attacks. Passphrases can
be subject to dictionary attack, especially when their length is exploited to produce
more meaningful phrases that are easy to recall [18]. Nevertheless, there is evidence
that the memorability of passphrases is almost the same as the memorability of
passwords, and users might not prefer them as an authenticator because of their
length [17].
Although forgotten passwords can be easily recovered [4], the existing fall-back
authentication mechanisms have some serious security or usability weaknesses [19,20].
For example, some fall-back authentication mechanisms rely on users’ email or phone
to recover or reset the forgotten-passwords. However, such mechanisms will fail
when users have no access to their email or phone devices. If attackers have an
access to users’ email accounts/phones, they can also gain access to users’ other
accounts by initiating fall-back authentication for those accounts. Nevertheless,
some other approaches use users’ trustee social contacts to rest the users’ passwords.
Such approach will send a verification code to the users’ trustees who then have
to send them to the users. Thus, the users can provide them to the website as
an evidence that they are the real account holders to reset their passwords. This
approach is less efficient than other fall-back approaches as the trustees might have
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slow responses [19]. Perhaps the most common fall-back mechanism is based on
challenge questions but it also has its own limitations which is explained later in
this section.
Nevertheless, the literature on password security reports techniques which are
commonly used in an effort to encourage good password selection, namely password
security education tools, password generators, reactive and proactive password
checkers. The first two are presented in Section 2.2, while Section 2.6 discusses the
remaining methods.
Dynamic text-based scheme: Some UK bank systems, such as that of Lloyds
Bank 2, use normal textual password along with a dynamic challenge-response
protocol. The system provides dynamic challenges which ask for a particular
character of their password and users have to respond to each challenge with the
correct character to authenticate themselves. However, passwords in this scheme can
be recovered or reset by using any fall-back authentication mechanisms as previously
mentioned in the Normal Text-based Scheme section.
Challenge-question based scheme: This system involves using a text password
which is a set of pairs (question, answer) as proof of identity. Several authentication
techniques based on challenge-questions have been proposed, such as the preference-
based technique and personal verification questions (PVQs) [21]. In these approaches,
a user gives predefined answers, called cognitive passwords, to a set of questions,
called challenges or prompts. In some systems, all the questions might be fixed for
each authentication attempt, while it might be dynamic in others. Each cognitive
password is associated with a particular question. In the creation of cognitive
passwords, users often rely on a logical analysis of available facts or concepts, in this
case related to the question, to create a password. There is evidence that cognitive
passwords can be more memorable than typical ones [22,23]. This is because they
are meaningful to a particular user and hints can help to easily recall them.
Currently, these systems are widely used as part of fall-back authentication, for
issuing password replacement, by most websites and as part of web authentication
in online banking [21]. However, the applicability of this technique might be limited
because the vast amount of personal information that is available online can aid
attackers to impersonate users and breach their accounts [4, 21]. Even if personal
information is kept private, the answers might be extracted from close friends. A
study on the security of personal security questions by Rabkin found that many
users used a few spaces as an answer for questions and they had answers that could
be found on social websites [21].
Perhaps there are difficulties in designing such high-quality authentication questions.
However, Rabkin emphasized the need for suitable user studies, as there is insufficient
2https://www.lloydsbank.com/online-banking/home.asp
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researches on user behaviors for assessing the security of personal security questions.
This gap also leaves an open question about the best design for personal security
questions. Further, the author declared that user behavior studies have not been
fully explored, especially in a wider population than graduate and undergraduate
students.
Recent paper studied the security and memorability of personal knowledge questions
on real data set [24]. The study found that secret questions are less secure than
user-chosen passwords and this is mostly because users’ answers are fake. The same
study also reported that users’ also found secure secret question hard to remember.
Prior study generates unpredictable questions via querying personal history was
proposed by Nosseir et al [25]. The most obvious weakness of this approach is the
lack of privacy.
Word association based scheme This mechanism is similar to challenge-question
systems, but instead of challenging a user with a single list of fixed questions, the
word association scheme challenges a user with a list of word association cues
randomly chosen by the system out of a predefined set of cues and answers [26].
Thus, the mechanism requires users to create a unique set of 20 word pairs. A pair
consists of a cue and an associative password which have a memorable relation. In
the authentication stage, users have to provide the correct response to a random
selection of cues shown by the system. Although a prior empirical study found correct
response words were remembered at a rate of 70% after 18 months of inactivity,
it also showed that the potential of guessing attack by partners was 50% (only a
couple was involved in the assessment of guess-ability) [26]. Several later studies
showed that the memorability rate of associative passwords is higher than that of
typical text passwords [22,23]. To the best of our knowledge, there has surprisingly
been no non-target attack evaluation study on the associative passwords.
In the case of forgot associative password, users perhaps can still authenticate
themselves by providing correct responses to several other cues [26]. However, users
also can regain access to their account by resetting their passwords when one or
more fall-back authentication mechanisms are supported (see the Normal Text-based
Scheme section).
Pass-Algorithm scheme In an effort to overcome the password memorability
problem, Haskett proposed the use of an algorithm in addition to a set of passwords
for authentication [27]. In other words, users should agree with a system with a
secret algorithm in the registration phase. When the users attempt to login to the
system, a set of passwords will be given to users as a challenge/question. Then,
the users should take each password and manipulate it using their agreed secret
algorithm to authenticate themselves. Haskett provides a simple example of a pass
algorithm in which a user applies the transformation technique for a word in a
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dynamic challenge, so the password for “BEL” is “CFM” [27]. The password is a
one-time password (OTP).
Haskett claims that the technique is flexible and easy to implement and could be a
good alternative to other authentication systems [27]. No evaluation studies have
been conducted on this technique, making it hard to prove the above statement.
However, the lack of studies leaves an open question about whether the use of
algorithm without the need for memorizing any other passwords will be sufficient in
practice.
In the case of forgot pass-algorithm, users perhaps can rest the agreed password
algorithm through using one or more fall-back authentication mechanisms which are
used for normal password recovery (see the Normal Text-based Scheme section).
Graphical Passwords
A graphical password is a password involving some visual element, which include
a sequence of coordinates (x, y) or a set of images. The concept is based on the
observation of peoples superior capacity to memorize pictures over words [28]. Thus,
the use of a graphical password might reduce the memory burden, which in turn
might enhance security via improving password selection.
Recall-based systems The first recall-based visual password mechanism was
Draw-A-Secret (DAS). This was proposed by Jermyn et al. as an alternative
solution to text passwords [29]. The challenge is similar to a static textual-based
authentication and the response is a sequence of coordinates. The technique requires
drawing a predefined shape by users on a two-dimensional (2-D) m× n grid using
either a mouse or a stylus.
DAS nowadays is becoming more popular as variants of DSA have been implemented
in touch screen mobile devices (i.e., Android lock patterns) and Windows devices
(i.e., Windows 10 picture password). However, van Oorschot and Thorpe found that
there is a tendency for users to draw a simple shape in the center of the grid [30],
suggesting that the used password space would be significantly smaller. Further, as
in any graphical password, DAS passwords are unprotected against observation due
to their visual aspect [4, 17,28].
Recognition-based systems Passfaces3 is an example of recognition-based graph-
ical authentication (cognometric). The authentication process involves users recogni-
tion of predefined graphics from a collection of distractors [31]. Specifically, users
select n human faces as a password in the registration. Then, at each authentication
attempt, the system challenges the users with several rounds of different panels of
candidate faces. In each round, users have to choose their preselected faces from
3This is a commercial system (http://www.passfaces.com/personal/)
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amongst distractions. This technique exploits the fact that people are more able to
recognize images previously seen than to recall them [28,31].
Evidence shows that recognition-based graphical passwords are the most memo-
rable visual passwords, while uncued-recall-based graphical passwords are the least
memorable [32]. However, recognition-based systems have the same weakness as the
other graphical-based schemes. They are vulnerable to shoulder surfing attack, and
this problem is exacerbated because the number of images used in the schemes is
relatively small.
Hence, it might be harder to deploy or use some visual schemes, such as recognition-
based graphical schemes, in resource-constrained devices such as mobile devices.
Moreover, one of the major challenges with the schemes is the possible attack via
observing users graphical password on the screen. Further, graphical passwords can
be guessable due to users poor password selection, like textual passwords, and can
be broken in dictionary attacks. Surprisingly, no attempt has been made to use
password checkers to eliminate guessable graphical passwords.
A recent study on the usability of multiple graphical passwords reveals that managing
several graphical passwords may pose the same problem as managing multiple
passwords [32]. The same study asserted that there have been few attempts to
compare graphical passwords with textual ones in terms of the usability of multiple
passwords.
Cued-recall systems PassPoints is an example of click-based graphical authenti-
cation (locimetric), where the system requires users to click on predefined points or
positions within an image, storing the password as sequence of coordinates. The
purpose of these systems is to decrease the memory load on users.
Passpoints challenges a user with a predefined set of points on a static image [33].
Users have to click these points in the correct order to authenticate themselves. The
image functions as a cue to identify the preselected locations. Note that this is not
an ideal challenge-response scenario, where only a static challenge is shown to users;
and they must respond with multiple passwords, referring to multiple points. In
terms of usability, although remembering multiple passwords may pose a problem,
the memorability problem in Passpoints might be lower than for text passwords [28].
However, similar to textual passwords, choosing unpredictable graphical passwords
remain challenging. This is because some regions or areas in an image are more
attractive to users. Several studies have reported success in automating hot-spot
attacks [28]. Further, similar to DAS, the system is vulnerable to shoulder surfing
attacks.
Conclusion To summarize, the popularity of graphical passwords is increasing in
personal technology, which incorporates touchscreen and/or pen-based technology
such as computers and GPS devices, giving the impression that graphical passwords
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can be superior to normal textual passwords [17]. However, perhaps some graphical
passwords, such as passfaces, can be superior to textual passwords in terms of the
memorability of a single password. Although all the graphical schemes benefit from
the memorability of pictures, however, their execution might take longer than that
of text passwords.
Graphical passwords can be easily reset as textual passwords [4]. The reset of
graphical password can be done via using one or more fall-back authentication
techniques such as challenge questions, email-based or phone-based techniques (see
Normal Text-based Scheme section for more details).
2.1.2 Token-based Authentication
Tokens have been proposed to tackle the mentioned weakness in knowledge-based
authentication methods as users do not need to memorize a secret. Tokens can
store static identification information, such as passwords, cryptographic keys and
biometric data, or dynamically generate OTP (explained later) via different protocols
which are based on time, counter, or challenge-response. Throughout this section we
call these stored and generated information as “authentication information”. The
authentication information then is either transmitted automatically by the tokens
or entered manually by users to authenticate themselves. This approach still relies
on users to presenting the token rather than remembering the password each time
they login to a system.
Tokens can be classified based on their appearance into hardware and software
tokens [34]. Hardware tokens are physical devices which are portable and normally
small. Smart cards, ID cards, and secure key fobs are examples of hardware tokens.
Some tokens come with or without a special input device (e.g., PIN pad) and/or
output device (e.g., small screen) according the deployed protocol. Such tokens
have several major limitations related to their higher costs, less flexibility and less
convenient comparing to software solutions.
Software tokens are a program which can be run on an existing smart device to
obtain a “passcode”. The “passcode” can be obtained by generating it locally using
the smart device credentials, or by demanding it from a server through an SMS
message. This solution is more flexible and cost-effective as they take an advantage
of embedding tokens on a single device.
In addition, tokens can be categorized into connected, disconnected and contact-less
tokens. For connected token, users have to plug-in their token at the time of login to
prove their identity. In this case, the authentication information will be automatically
sent, taking the effort out of users. Hence, a special relative reader device (e.g.,
USB port and smart card reader) must be used in order to read such tokens. By
contrast, disconnected tokens do not establish a physical connection to transmit
the authentication information. Yet, they have a display device to present the
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authentication information. Then, this information should be entered manually by
users to authenticate themselves. For contact-less tokens, the tokens form a wireless
connection using a RFID technology as an example to transfer the authentication
information.
The main weakness of any of these tokens is that they can be lost or stolen and then
used by attackers. This is why many of these systems make use of another factor,
such as PINs, for further protection [4, 17,34].
One time password can be considered as token based authentication. An OTP is a
password that is valid for exactly one authentication attempt or a period of time.
Lamport the OTP scheme with the aim of avoiding the threat of replay attacks
which exists in the traditional text password authentication scheme [35]. A replay
attack is a form of network attack where a user sends his/her password over the
network and this transmission is delayed or repeated by attackers.
OTP schemes represent two-factor authentication where two different authentication
techniques can be used, a password and a token. Lamports OTP technique depends
on a mathematical calculation for generating a sequence of OTPs, each value based
on the previous one. The token is used to generate an OTP mi from an appropriate
challenge which is a number of authentications to be performed issued by the system.
Then, the system requires the user to pass the generated OTP mi for authentication
purposes, in which the system computes H(mi) using a hash function and compares
it with the stored hash of the password. After each successful authentication, the
system updates the stored hash of the password with a new mi, which is equal to
mi−1 , to create a unique sequence authentication number i+1 for the next challenge.
Later, the OTP algorithm evolves from the S/KEY [35].
If the system does not receive the OTP, however, repeating the challenge would be
risky, since the OTP related to that challenge might be intercepted and replied to
by attacker for access. Therefore, the challenge sequence needs to be random. There
are many studies on this topic seeking to tackle the above problem.
The use of a token might also be inconvenient. Organizations with over million
customers have to buy, install and maintain vast amounts of tokens, which is very
costly. Although some critical systems such as banking have deployed OTP schemes,
other uncritical systems such as email services might find that providing a specific
token for their customers is very expensive. In addition, users will need to handle
several tokens belonging to several accounts, which turns out to be problematic.
In an effort to solve these problems, Aloul et al. proposed an inexpensive mobile-
based token [34]. However, this raises a concern about privacy, since the mobile
number must be stored on a website database. In addition, the token might be
stolen or lost such that legitimate users are unable to access the system.
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Figure 2.1: A biometric system [2]
2.1.3 Biometric-based Authentication
To gain more reliable and robust authentication method, biometrics have been
proposed. Biometrics takes advantage of users unique characteristics, “who you
are”, to authenticate them. Biometrics removes users’ dependency on memorizing
passwords or/and having tokens. Biometrics authentication systems can be based
on physical or behavioral characteristics. Both types of biometrics are believed to
be a unique, unforgettable, irrevocable and unhidden identifier, making them hard
to be repudiated [36].
A variety of biometrics authentication solutions have been proposed. The most well
known biometrics technologies based on physical characters are fingerprint Scan,
facial scan, iris scan, hand scan, palm scan, and voice scan. For behavioral biometrics
solutions, keystrokes, gait scan, touch dynamics and signature scan are examples of
behavioral based authentication. Each solution has its own strength and weakness
which make it more usable for a specific application [36,37].
A typical biometric system involves enrollment and verification stages (see Figure 2.1).
The enrollment stage is done one time at the account registration. In the enrollment
phase, the system will start by getting biometric data (B) of a user (Y ), extracting a
set of features (X) out of B, storing the extracted features (XE), as a template (D)
in a database linked to identifier. The verification stage is done each time a user tries
to log into the system. In this stage, the system needs to again extract biometric
features (XR) of a user by repeating the first two process in the enrollment stage,
then compare XR with the stored template (D) associated to the user (one-to-one
match) to verify the user’s claimed identity. The biometrics’ verification result (S)
is determined by a confidence measure (a pre-defined threshold) to accept or reject
users’ access.
However, biometric systems have serious limitations which negatively impact on their
widespread adoption. Some weakness are related to their error rates. Unlike tokens
and knowledge based authentication approaches, biometrics may produce wrong
verification decision since the decision is made according to a pre-defined threshold.
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This means that errors can be made such as 1) False Acceptances (FA), accepting
illegitimate users, and 2) False Rejections (FR), rejecting legitimate users [36]. In
addition, the quality of feature extraction can be also affected by noise factors (n)
while scanning the biometric data (see Figure 2.1). Hence, this may also increase
the error rates if the quality of the acquired biometric data is low.
In terms of security, some biometrics approach can be faked such as faces and
fingerprints. Liveliness detection has been proposed to alleviate the problem [38].
Nevertheless, this did not completely solve the problem for all biometrics. For
example, a face-based recognition system can be forged by an impersonator when
(s)he wears a facial mask of an authorized user. In this case, the liveliness detection
will fail to detect the faked face as the impersonator can move and blink his eyes.
This would suggest that such problems can be avoided if biometrics are used with
additional factors such as tokens.
Further more, one weakness in biometrics corresponds to the difficulty with replacing
it, which raises privacy, confidentiality and security concerns when this critical
information is illegitimately used and shared by others or even stolen [4, 39, 40].
Researchers have shown that biometric data can be reproduced from biometric
templates highlighting the importance of protecting biometric templates [40, 41].
One suggestion is to transform the original biometric template by, as an example,
hashing or encrypting them as an attempt to avoid storing it in clear. Ballard
et.al [42] show that biometric cryptographic key can bee attacked. One recent paper
highlights challenges of protecting biometric templates [43]. The paper also shows
that current biometric templates protection methods fail to ensure nonlinkability and
revocability of protected biometric templates, insisting that the use of multi-factor
authentication would solve this issue.
Moreover, a biometric capturing device is required to capture biometric data, which
may not be always available to users. On the other hand, some biometric features
can change throughout the lifetime because of illness, accidents or even aging, which
makes the system less useful when legitimate users cannot access it.
2.1.4 Context-aware Authentication
Context-aware authentication approaches have been proposed as the 4th factor for
user authentication. One benefit of using context-aware authentication is that the
system can verify users without interrupting then unless there is a detection of
suspicious activity. In other words, the verification can be done without an explicit
action from users but this can be automatically captured by a system through
sensors, as an example.
A better understanding of such systems, we need first to know a clear definition
of contextual information. Dey and Abowd delineated context as any information
that characterize an entity’s state where the entity can be anything relevant to
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users’ identity (e.g.,person, location, or object) [44]. Hayashi et al. defined context
information as any information about the user’s identity either implicitly (named
passive information such as users’ location) or explicitly (named passive information
such as fingerprints) [45].
Context-based authentication is different from other authentication factors in terms
of capturing and involving environmental attributes to make a better decision on the
legitimacy of users’ requested access. The environmental attributes can be associated
to computers (e.g., IP address, accessing time, and computer properties), users (e.g.,
location, surrounded area, people or objects, activities), or physical conditions (e.g.,
surrounded noise, lighting, and size of room) [44].
Many organizations have adopted context-aware authentication systems to detect
suspicious logins [46,47]. Nowadays, context-aware authentication have been applied
to detect credit card frauds, as an example. Some banks would require users to
provide supported information to prove their identity if they login from different
devices. Some banks compare the new access request time and location with the
last one and ask for further proof of identity if they do not match.
Context-aware authentication methods have various limitations. Capturing and
analyzing contextual information may involve machine learning and intelligence
methods. This would lead to potential invasion of privacy if it is not securely
protected. In addition, the fraud detection may not always succeed and an illegal
access would be possible. For instance, if the case is limiting the access from outside
the working hours, the system still cannot discriminate the authorized user from
others unless an active factor is also used.
2.1.5 Multi-factor Authentication (MFA)
Multi-factor authentication schemes are a mixture of at least two authentication
factors as an attempt to enhance security. Each authentication factor should be
satisfied to grant access. Hardware tokens such as smart cards are typical examples
of such systems, where both tokens and PINs are combined to resist different
attacks including card loss and theft. Similarly, context-based authentication can be
another example if active (e.g., password) and passive (e.g., geo location) factors are
combined.
MFA has been urged by the European Central Bank to enforce the use of strong
authentication for all their online transactions [34]. MFA is the most ubiquitous
authentication system on e-banking [47]. Although this will raise security, users
have a tendency to prefer using simple authentication scheme [47]. Moreover, MFA
are inflexible as the factors should be provided in predefined order. It also do not
take into consideration the divers users’ requirements and preference. Consequently,
some MFA techniques may not be less usable for some people especially those who
would have a disability (e.g., blindness) that affect their usability. A paper [34]
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shows that MFA which has been deployed for e-banking do not support users
with more than three predefined types of factors. This may make the system
functionality more predictable by attackers which may reduce their effort in cracking
the system. Moreover, the deployment of MFA may require a complete change to
the legacy system which would make e-banking more conservatives to adopted such
authentication technologies.
2.2 Usability & Security Tradeoff
2.2.1 Password Policies
Many researchers have suggested that imposing good password policies can help
to force users to creating more complex and stronger passwords [48–50]. Password
policies are strict requirements proposed by security communities and experts to
increase the security of passwords in a given system. They are often used with
password checkers (see Section 2.6), where users are allowed to select their own
passwords, but only those compliant with password policies are allowed.
Several studies highlight the effect of password policies on the strength of passwords.
Strict password policies can increase the burden on users to remember long and
complicated passwords; as a result, they may write them down, thereby increasing
the vulnerability of the system [50]. Vu et al. also discovered that the possibility
of memorizing passwords decreased as more passwords were evoked. In an attempt
to achieve memorability, users generally satisfy these policies in a predictable and
uncomplicated way, meaning that there is a potential risk of reducing password
strength [51]. Moreover, strict password restrictions are not always understandable
or convenient for users, which might result in a growing feeling of frustration and
reduction of productivity [52,53].
Another study asserted that extensive password policies can have major adverse
effects on systems security instead of optimizing it [50], implying that the usability
of passwords and password policies might be of vital importance to protect computer
system. Florencio and Herley found that even organizations with sensitive assets not
use highly strict policies, suggesting that usability more important than security [54].
Further, Vu et al. asserted that enforcing password policies without any assistance
is insufficient for producing stronger passwords [50]. Therefore, combining password
policies with different techniques can be beneficial to guarantee the creation of
stronger password by users.
2.2.2 User Behavior
The need for good password management has been addressed in the literature and
some password guidelines; passwords should be memorized, frequently changed,
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randomly assigned and well protected [55]. However, these rules challenge users
cognitive abilities and eventually decrease productivity.
Users cannot memorize random, meaningless passwords. On the other hand, there
is a potential drawback in permitting users to produce their own passwords, as
simple, weak passwords are often selected. Therefore, very strong passwords can be
guaranteed by allowing a computer system to create passwords on users behalf. The
passwords consist of random characters with no link to users, making them highly
resistance to guessing attack. However, the password memorability problem can be
exacerbated by password complexity and meaninglessness. This encourages some
insecure practices which have a direct negative impact on security. For example, users
favour writing them down [54–56], meaning that a breach of generated passwords is
possible.
On the other hand, some studies assert that when users are allowed to generate
passwords consisting of random alphanumeric and symbol characters, they are able
to create meaningful passwords which are more memorable than computer-generated
ones [34,57].
Users behaviours relating to password systems were studied in 1999 [55], demonstrat-
ing that when remembering passwords becomes difficult, users tend to store them
somewhere they can reach and share them with others, thereby putting themselves
at risk of social engineering attack. Moreover, the strict enforcement of password
policies may lead users to low security motivation and practices. For example,
users replace their passwords with less secure ones when they are forced to replace
them frequently. Password policy enforcement also leads to major pressure on the
information technology (IT) help desk because of requests to reset passwords [55].
Several later studies found that users reuse a few passwords and often choose weak
ones because they have more accounts [54,56,58]. Users failed to recall more than
a quarter of their accounts [56], which are 25 accounts on average [54]. Prior
studies attributed insecure password behaviours to a low awareness of their negative
consequences of password breaches and the scope of that damage [54–56]. The main
argument is that the absence of feedback regarding password security causes users to
build their own model of conceivable security threats which does not always translate
into good password management practices.
Adams and Sasse asserted that users are often directed by what they see [55]; however,
Notoatmodjo and Thomborson argued that users practice cannot be taken a sign
of unawareness or lack of concern, but rather of memorability issues. They found
that although users were aware of the basic principles of password security, they
did not change their poor password practices [58]. The findings showed that users
understood that high-risk accounts are more worthy of securing than less valuable
accounts. Hence, the underlying causes of password mismanagement are associated
with memorability issues in addition to the failure of identifying which account is
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more important.
However, it is obvious that the education and assistance of users is essential even for
those who are aware of password security in choosing passwords for vital accounts.
Moreover, the fact that users are security conscious cannot be taken a sign of their
full understanding of password security; moreover, taking into account the small
study sample (26 students at the University of Auckland), the results of the above
study cannot generalized or taken as representative. Users perceptions can vary, and
without clear feedback, they may not be able to form correct judgments on password
management [59].
2.2.3 Password management
These studies encourage other technical solutions for helping users to manage their
passwords, as well as alleviating users burden in remembering passwords. Most
modern web browsers provide automated fill of the user name and passwords fields
for websites that are revisited by users. Specifically, users passwords are optionally
encrypted with a master password and stored in a password database on a computer
from a prior login. Although users no longer need to remember their passwords
(except when they use the optional master password for the encryption), they might
not be able to access the stored passwords using a different computer device. The
system accessibility might become worse when all stored passwords are lost through
computer corruption, especially if we know that there is no way to recover them.
Nevertheless, some browsers like Firefox also offers a Sync tool to store the encrypted
passwords in the cloud as a solution for this [4]. On the other hand, this might pose
additional security problems because of the remote storage. Moreover, the problem
of password reuse is not addressed.
In an effort to resolve the issues of the above technique, several approaches have
been proposed. For example, single sign-on (SSO) systems offer users a way to
authenticate themselves by registering with a trusted server that checks users identity
for multiple accounts via a single password. However, there has been criticism of
the SSO concerning the protection of privacy, as SSO schemes rely on third parties
such as Microsoft Passport [60]. However, OpenID [61], an SSO scheme which was
designed to offer multiple identity providers, allows technically knowledgeable users
to operate their own identity provider. Still, the loss of the availability of the SSO
as a result of denial of services attack can be another issue.
Password hashing schemes such as Passpet [62], HP Site Password [63] and PwdHash
[64] are another way of managing passwords. Here, a single password called a “master
password” can be used with a second, non-secret identifier such as a website URL
to form a unique password for each account [62]. Each unique password is then
encrypted using a one-way hash function to add protection against attacking the
master password. The schemes allow users to remember only the master password
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for multiple accounts, while each account has a unique password. The schemes also
allow for avoiding storage of the passwords, as they are computed, meaning that
the users are able to access the system from anywhere [62]. However, it is not clear
whether there is a way to recover the master password if it is forgotten.
2.3 Attacks on Passwords
It is important to understand possible threat to password security in order to improve
its strength. Passwords are vulnerable to several attacks that can result from factors
relative to human or the used authentication system. Password guessing sometimes
can happen either online or oﬄine. In an online attack, attackers will try to predict
passwords during the login stage. To mitigate the attack risk, security mechanisms
such as CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing Test To Tell Computers
and Humans Apart) and lockout policies have been used. This would limit the
number of guessing attempts which can be done by an attacker. However, the live
detection of suspicious login can be avoided if the attack occurrence is not repeated
in a short time [14]. On the other hand, an oﬄine attack occurs when an attacker
steals hashed passwords that are stored in a server. Hence, the attacker can try
unlimited number of guesses without the need for a live interaction with the server.
This give them enough time to guess hashed passwords. However, this section
presents a selection of such crucial guessing attacks.
2.3.1 Brute Force Attacks
Attackers attempt to guess passwords via an exhaustive search of all possible
combination of strings. Each combination is hashed and compared with the hashed
password to find the correct one.
2.3.2 Dictionary Attacks
Attackers search for a password within one or more password dictionaries. A
dictionary attack differs from a brute force attack in that it limits the research to
more probable matches, rather than trying all the possible combinations, to increase
the speed of searching. Attackers often use a leaked password database for dictionary
attacks. They also can use dictionaries constructed from familiar words and phrases
such as phone numbers, popular names and words from English and other languages.
2.3.3 Targeted Dictionary Attack
This can be a special case of dictionary attack where the used dictionary contains
personal information about a user. The targeted attacker takes advantage of such
knowledge (e.g., users name, first and family name, birth date, etc) to decrement
the required number of guesses to find passwords.
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2.3.4 Rule based Dictionary Attack
Attackers use rules to transform the given password before performing the dictionary
attack. For example, some of these rules apply password reservation or concatenation
with prefixes and postfixes to identify more complicated passwords.
2.3.5 Hybrid Attack
A hybrid dictionary attack is when brute-force attacks are appended to dictionary
attack. This approach is similar to what real attackers do.
2.4 Password Cracking
Password cracking has been started since at least Morris worm in 1988. A dictionary
of 432 entries and several transformation rules were applied. Later, almost all
cracking tools, such as Hashcat, John the Ripper, and Cain and Abel, combine
transformation rules with either brute force or dictionary attacks to crack passwords.
Password cracking has benefited from distributed and parallel computing to leverage
a large pool of computing devices to launch attacks. For instance, many password
cracking tools have been optimized to run with GPUs.
Recently, more advanced attacks has been proposed to improve the power of password
cracking tools. All these cracking methods train set of clear passwords to determinate
the probability of each password to be chosen. Passwords then will be ordered in
descending order according to their estimated probabilities which will be later used
for actual cracking. Theses approaches can be classified into the four categorize
which are explained below.
2.4.1 Markov Model Based Method
Markov models are used to eliminate the search space when the use of brute-force
attack is required. Narayanan and Shmatikov are probably the first researchers who
employed Markov models for password cracking [9]. The first-order Markov model
was used to estimate the probabilities of each password character conditional to its
previous neighbor based on language dictionaries and leaked password databases.
In the first-order Markov model, the probability of each character depends on the
probability of the previous character. Thus, the possibility that a letter ′h will follow
w is greater than for other letters in English.
However, Castelluccia et al. [65] enhanced the Markov model in [9]. They used
n-th order Markov models in which the probability of a character n− 1 characters.
Nevertheless, both algorithms do not consider the descending order of likelihood.
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A recent work proposed Ordered Markov ENumerator (OMEN) to overcome this
limitation [66].
2.4.2 Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars (PCFG)
This approach considers the structure of passwords in which the probability of
chosen passwords with a certain structure is higher than the other passwords having
another structure. Weir et al. proposed the first probabilistic cracking algorithm
based on PCFG [10]. The algorithm works in two stages. The first stage focuses on
constructing a PCFG through using a large collection of leaked password datasets
as a training set . In the second stage, password patterns, like D7L1 for seven digits
followed by a letter, are produced from the generated PCFG and password guesses
are calculated for actual cracking. This method succeeded in cracking 28% to 129%
more passwords in comparison with the password cracking tool “John the Ripper”.
2.4.3 Machine Learning Based Method
Recently, neural networks were used to predict passwords. Melicher et al. [11] used
machine-learning methods to model human brain to predict the probability of the
next character based on a preceding string input [11]. Their approach was tested
against the state-of-art and among the current cracking methods, this approach
has been founded more efficient than the methods mentioned earlier in this section.
Melicher et al. reported that their approach can compress the used neural networks to
hundreds of kilobytes without considerable degrading the efficiency of their approach
to guess passwords.
2.4.4 Personalized Based Methods
Recent enhancements to some of the above attacks consider personal information
in their models and algorithms to improve their efficiency in cracking passwords.
Personal-PCFG [13], TarGuess [12] and OMEN+ [66] are examples of personalized
based techniques.
2.4.5 Comparisons
However, any cracking technique’s effectiveness is influenced by its configuration. A
comparative study of different probabilistic password models reported that Markov
models perform better than PCFG [67]. Evidence shows that for some cases PCFG
surpassed Markov models [68]. Another evaluation study of 12 state-of-the-art
password cracking algorithms reported that there is no ideal cracking mechanism for
all scenarios as their performances are affected by different factors, including the
training databases and the used algorithm [69]. The same study highlighted the risk
on trusting a single cracking algorithm to determine password strength. In another
work, a cracking model based on neural networks was founded more effective in
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predicting none-typical password policies compared with other password cracking
methods and its compressed size did not degrade its efficiency [11].
2.5 Evaluation of Password Strength
Password strength has received a considerable attention recently with the growth of
cracking efforts. Password experts largely agree that password strength should refer
to minimum effort that is required to crack the password [70]. The definition implies
that password strength can be measured, however, the certainty of estimation is
attributed to the used technique.
There has been several attempts to estimate the strength of passwords. Throughout
this thesis, when clarity is needed to indicate a method for measuring password
strength, the term password strength metering (PSM) will be used. This can
be categorized into statistical or parametrized approaches [71]. The statistical
methods focus on predicting the overall strength of passwords while the focus of the
probabilistic approaches is to determine the guess-ability under a particular cracking
technique. This section gives a brief overview of techniques in both categories.
2.5.1 Statistical Methods
Entropy-based metering
A basic measure used by many website attempts to examine password strength
based on simple rules related to the password format such as the password length
and different types of characters used. One typical example of these methods is the
password entropy proposed by NIST in [51].
The NIST’s entropy-based method is derived from Shannons information theory [72]4.
However, this has been founded as an arbitrary password strengthen estimator.
Although entropy might be linked to guess resistance, evidences show the low
correlation between password entropy and the actual guess resistance [49, 73, 74].
This is because the entropy value provides information about the actual storage
size of the password rather than measuring the passwords resistance to guessing. In
comparison with the above approaches, perhaps zxcvbn [75] uses more complicated
methods which in turn give more accurate results.
Guessability-based metering
Several studies have proposed guessing metrics which are based on the fact that in an
ideal attack, the highest probability password are tried first, and hence, guessability
measures the estimated number of unsuccessful tries before guessing the correct
4assword entropy denotes the uncertainty of random words.
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password. Several researchers have proposed to quantify the number of guesses in
idealize attack such as [49,74,76]. A partial guessing metric, as an example, designed
to quantify guesses numbers in idealize attack. Unfortunately, these approaches
require enormous sample size to produce an accurate result. Moreover, most of
them do not consider hybrid attack strategy, which can dramatically improve the
results [71]. Consequently, this poses two major problems: 1) their effectiveness
cannot be generalized as it would be affected by the configuration settings and the
chosen attack; 2) their time performance would be reduced when there is a need to
run an attack. According to the mentioned limitation, these approaches may not be
suitable to be used with proactive password checkers (see Section 2.6).
2.5.2 Parametrized Methods
These methods attempt to overcome the limitation of statistical metrics. In other
words, they consider evaluating password security against real attacks instead of
idealized attacks. Some of these measures are based on Markov model such as
adaptive password strength meters (APSMs) [65], probabilistic context-free grammar
(PCFG) [77] or neural networks [11]. There are also strength metering algorithms
based on personalized PCFG such as [13, 14]. Moreover, a recent paper proposed
using a Monte Carlo approach evaluating password strength [70].
2.5.3 Limitations on PSM
In terms of password metering, it is clear that there is a gap between the current
password strength estimators and practical attacks. Attackers might perform an
unusual brute force attack using different criteria and assumptions. Thus, the
attacker might successfully guess password before reaching the expected guessing
numbers, showing there is no fixed number of guesses. Further, although imposing
higher restrictions on password selection can increase the strength of passwords, the
same restriction may be exploited by attackers for their advantages, such as limiting
their attempts to a certain password distribution and increasing their vulnerability
to attacks [10].
Nevertheless, there is a limited understanding of password security caused by several
methodological issues [74]. For example, the inconsistency between the sizes of
dictionaries used in different studies makes direct comparison difficult. Moreover,
it is difficult to reproduce precise results, since dictionaries and cracking tools are
subject to change or might even become unavailable. Further, the study results
are influenced by the dictionary content, such that the dictionary language should
suit the dataset under study. All of these considerations show the difficulty and
complexity of password strength evaluation.
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2.6 Password Checkers
Password checkers are software tools used to check the strength of given passwords
in order to detect and/or prevent use of weak passwords. In the literature, two types
of password checkers have been used to encourage and/or enforce good password
selection and assist network administrators. There are two types of password checkers:
proactive password checkers (PPCs) and reactive password checkers (RPCs) [57].
PPCs are client-side tools interacting with end users when they are creating passwords
and giving immediate feedback on the user interface to inform users about the
password strength. They are often combined with password policies so that known
weak passwords are banned. RPCs are server-side tools performing regular scans of
the password database by launching simulated password cracking attempts. Detected
weak passwords by RPCs will be sent to network administrators and/or affected
users for actions. In this section, we focus on PPCs because they can offer more
opportunities to educate end users directly. It is a promising method as it has
recently been used by many websites.
PPCs can be traced back to research work conducted in the early 1990s [8, 78].
Nowadays PPCs have become ubiquitous on computer systems and websites, as
a standard component of the password creation and update processes. The basic
functionality of a PPC is to give immediate feedback on the strength of the password
the user is entering so that the user can make a more informed decision on if the
current password is strong enough to be used. Such feedback is normally given in
a visual channel (on the display of the user’s computing device), although other
communication channels (e.g., audio channel) can also be used.
It has been observed that PPCs could influence users to choose stronger passwords
[79–81], but users can also be confused by inappropriate/inconsistent strength ratings
given by different PPCs [48]. Much research [11,13,14,75,82] has therefore been done
to develop more robust password strength meterings (PSMs) so that the estimated
password strength matches the actual risk against password crackers better, which
however is not a well-defined task because 1) there are many ways a password
cracker process can be designed and executed and 2) the risk should be context
dependent [68,69,83].
At the UI level, some studies [80, 84] have showed that the PPC UI design matters
in terms of influencing users to create stronger passwords, and some designs could
be more effective. The most common UI design is a (horizontal or vertical) 1-D bar
(or segmented box) showing the estimated password strength score as a progress
bar, a colored bar/box, and sometimes a very short textual description such as
“weak” and “very strong” as well. Some PPCs also show a more detailed textual
description (maybe visible only after a link/button being clicked), which can cover
recommendations on how to improve the current password and password policies.
Some PPCs choose to use different PSMs e.g. those based on peer pressure [82] and
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fear appeal [84], which also require the UI to be designed differently. Among all
PPCs we are aware of, one PPC [85] is quite unique in displaying multiple 1-D bars,
which show details about how the overall password strength score is calculated based
on multiple sub-ratings. Although the multi-bar PPC is much more informative,
Ciampa found out it is the hardest to understand compared with other simpler
PPCs [80]. The general absence of clear feedback and sufficient information about
the returned password strength scores in PPCs can leave users confused about why
a password is given a specific rating by a PPC thus let them choose to neglect PPCs
and depend on their own subject judgments on passwords [81,86].
Vance et al. studied the impact of a PPC’s interactivity on persuading users towards
stronger passwords [84]. Three various password checkers with different levels of
interactivity were examined, which are an interactive horizontal bar based PPC, a
static fear appeal based PPC, and an interactive fear appeal based PPC. The study
findings reported the significant influence of an interactive fear appeal meter among
other security indicators.
Ciampa studied the effectiveness of four different UI designs on password feedback
mechanisms in PPCs [80]. Besides a common 1-D bar PPC, he also examined (1) a
dial reading based PPC [87], (2) a fear appeal based PPC [88], (3) the multi-bar PPC
“The Password Meter” [85]. His results showed that the fear appeal based PPC is the
most effective among all the four tested feedback mechanisms on influencing users
towards stronger passwords. However, the majority of participants were observed
preferring the multi-bar PPC, even though it was the hardest to understand. Ciampa
also reported the need of supporting users with the required security level based on
the used context.
Ur et al. conducted a comparative study on PPCs used by 14 popular websites in
2012 [79]. They found out that most PPCs studied have a simple 1-D bar based UI
design. They also found out that different PPCs’ appearances did not have major
effect on either users’ attitudes or password arrangement. Although using PPCs
did motivate users to creating longer passwords, which were not observed to be less
memorable, users often did not have a clue about the reason behind ratings given
by PPCs, which might cause confusion and mislead them when improper PSMs are
used. They also found out that participants had tended to select weaker passwords
when they became frustrated, and lost trust in the PPC. Similar observations around
the psychological phenomenon “frustration” and “discomfort” were also reported by
Haque et al. in a 2014 study [89].
Furnell’s study [90] revealed great inconsistencies among PPCs on 10 popular
websites, and the password composition recommendations given by those websites
were largely unclear and insufficient to guide users. The same observations were
reported by de Carne´ de Carnavalet and Mannan in their work [48], in which they
examined 13 PPCs deployed at 11 widely-used web services.
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Komanduri et al. proposed a system called Telepathwords [91], which predicts most
likely weak passwords based on the current password as the prefix and show them to
alert users about such choices (since guessable passwords are weak). Telepathwords
is not a PPC per the standard definition, but it show the security of the current
password in a different way to guide users. They reported that the quality of
passwords created using Telepathwords were higher than a number of PPCs they
used for comparison. However, although users found that the feedback given by
Telepathwords was helpful, many of them also reported it being difficult and annoying
to use. This again highlighted the difficulty of designing good password security
tools.
Some recently-reported personalized attacks on passwords [12, 13] imply that PSMs
and PPCs need to be personalized and contextualized. This is also echoed by Loge
et al.’s work on a PPC for Android graphical unlock patterns [92], in which they
observed that the password strength could be influenced by individual features such
as age and gender.
2.7 Password Visualization
In addition, recently some researchers [93–96] have studied how to visualize collections
of passwords (mostly password databases leaked from compromised servers). Such
password visualizers are normally designed for security professionals to conduct
analysis on collective behavior of users’ choice of passwords for online services. They
may be used to educate end users as well if properly designed so that understanding
(in)secure patterns does not require advanced technical knowledge (the 4-digit PIN
visualization in [94] being a good example). In addition to visualization of password
collections, Zhang-Kennedy et al.’s work [97] shows that visualization can help users
to understand password guessing attacks.
2.8 User Studies
As noted, password research may involve consideration of several aspects, namely
password creation, password management, visualization tools and systems, aiming
at testing developed hypotheses. No matter how valid of the theoretical hypotheses,
if they do not provide proof of concept, they are of little importance. User studies
offer scientifically rational approaches to evaluating hypotheses. Although user
studies are commonly employed in the field of human-computer interaction (HCI)
and information science (IS), the different methods of user studies, to the best of our
knowledge, have been rarely studied explicitly in password security research. This
section gives a general overview of user studies in the password security literature
and their challenges. This section briefly defines the objectives of user studies and
provides some examples of previous work on password research. It also focuses on
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the methodologies used, their pitfalls and their advantages.
There are various reasons to preform user studies in our research. Studies can be used
to understand user behavior better regarding a particular technique and whether
users can achieve their goals effectively when they are supported differently. Another
main objective of conducting user studies is to gain insight into the effectiveness of
a particular method. This might help to improve the method, show the usefulness
of the approach in a practical sense or determine the most appropriate situation for
yielding high-quality results. Comparative studies might be carried out to identify
the most effective solution for a given condition.
In the password literature, many examples of user studies can be found which
attained different goals. For example, in [55], a web-based survey and in-depth
interviews were applied to understand user practices regarding password systems in
terms of password construction, usage and recall [55].
The work in [56] is also another example of a study that obtained information about
password managements and reuse via lab testing and an online survey. Moreover, [80]
compared and contrasted four different user interfaces of password checkers to
determine their effect on password entropy and their ability to influence users to
choose stronger passwords. Other recent studies worthy of attention involving
large-scale, online studies on evaluating password meters via crowdsourcing websites
are [98] and [80].
With the knowledge gained from the above research, user studies can range from con-
trolled experimental studies conducted in artificial environments to test a hypothesis
to field studies, which are less controlled and take place in the users real environment.
Controlled studies are in most cases performed in a closed environment such as a lab,
with appropriate equipment aimed at reducing the impact of outside conditions to
draw clear conclusions. However, these results might not reflect the wider population
due to the artificial context compared to the open environment in field studies,
which might lead to easy generalization. In unrestricted environments, participants
have the choice to accomplish their tasks at any time and place, which increases
the possibility of finding participants. On the other hand, tasks are completed
by participants who may be inattentive, giving imprecise results. To mitigate the
challenges of both environments, some user studies fall somewhere in between, where
they can be implemented in both open and controlled environments, such as in [99].
In addition to the study environment, there are different options concerning the type
of study used. The choices vary based on the method which is used for data collection
and evaluation. Generally, usability testing, surveys, interviews, observations, focus
groups and cognitive walkthroughs are examples of these methods. However, to the
best of our knowledge, the most common methods of data collection in studying
passwords are surveys and usability testing.
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Surveys raise direct qualitative and/or quantitative questions to users for the purpose
of gaining information on user satisfaction, opinions and evaluations relating to
a system. Such information can comprise usability components which cannot be
measured via clear measurement methods [100]. Such surveys can be either paper-
based or computer-based to facilitate data collection and manipulation. They
can also be published online to easily reach a wide population, speeding the data
collection and analysis process; surveys created through the use of web services such
as SurveyMonkey.com are termed web-based surveys, while those created through
the use of ones own hardware and software are termed online surveys. Parts of [59]
and [56] give examples of web-based and online survey studies. There are also
examples where a paper-based survey was used, such as [53], but such research are
rare [101]. In any case, the survey questions, measures and instructions should
be well planned and evaluated in order to check their validity in measuring what
the researchers intend them to assess, as well as their reliability, which determines
whether they are consistently understood by participants [100]. Definitely the most
common method for evaluating surveys is pilot testing, where feedback is collected
from a number of participants concerning the issues with the surveys.
Usability testing is crucial for a system survival. As mentioned at the beginning of
this chapter, security and usability are considered conflicting goals. In the literature,
many examples of security schemes have been criticized for poor usability. Therefore,
usability testing has a major positive effect on system improvement [102]. Moreover,
it helps to compare and contrast systems.
Typically, usability testing is employed to identify any difficulties experienced by
users as they perform a group of predefined tasks. Researchers should design these
tasks carefully to imitate a genuine scenario to ensure the validity of the results.
Likewise, the testing should take place in as realistic an environment as possible.
Piazzalunga et al. summarized usability testing into the eight following steps [103],
which can be adapted to studies with different techniques such as surveys:
1. Define the research targets and scope;
2. Determine the research environment and the role of participants and researchers.
In [102], the authors mentioned that usability testing can be conducted in
labs, remotely or onsite. Like onsite testing, remote testing is conducted in
participants environments, unlike in lab testing where participants need to be
tested in a lab. The advantage of onsite testing over remote and lab testing is
that researchers travel to participants environments to observe them. However,
in remote testing participants and researchers are in different locations and
they might communicate remotely;
3. Define the representative sample of users and a set of tasks to be accomplished
by them;
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4. Design a set of metrics related to usability attributes for use in the evaluation
step. Nielsen defined five usability attributes, namely learn ability, efficiency,
memorability, errors and satisfaction [104];
5. Have each participant perform the tasks;
6. Collect the data;
7. Process the data to guarantee their statistical significance; and
8. Estimate the usability scores based on the set of metrics.
As mentioned, both surveys and usability testing can be implemented in different
environments. For example, labs can offer a controlled environment compared
with online studies, allowing participants to be monitored while testing systems or
completing surveys. The data can be gathered using digital recording and techniques
such as eye tracking, as well as system logs to focus on observing specific and
unexpected features. Further, some methods can be used in combination with
observation, such as “thinking aloud”, where users are asked to comment on tasks
as the test is running, and pre/post questionnaires [102].
Laboratory studies have raised potential issues with ecological validity, which refers
to the studys ability to reflecting reality. To illustrate, the artificial setting in
laboratory studies might create pressures related to time and being observed for users.
Participants fear concerning their privacy can prevent them from revealing realistic
or correct information [101,102]. For example, participants in some usability studies
changed their behavior in order to meet the expectations of the researchers [101,105].
On the other hand, unlike in laboratory studies, disingenuous responses cannot be
easily detected in online studies where the researchers are not present [100–102,106].
For example, since it is difficult to control participants identities experimentally, the
results might be also faked with multiple responses received from the same participant.
This can occur for some reasons either by the researchers or the participants which
are beyond the scope of this work.
In planning user studies, the choice of methods is affected by several practical
considerations. The most essential factor is the economics of gathering data. It is
obvious that participant recruitment, participant observation and equipment may
require financial and time costs. Hence, some methods are more costly and time
intensive than others. For example, obtaining users input in laboratory studies is
always high cost and time consuming compared to online studies. Therefore, there
has to be a trade-off between the number of participants and cost effectiveness in
laboratory studies [106].
The sample size and the diverse population of the study are other primary factors.
The validity of the results of a study normally relies on obtaining more reliable
and representative results. For example, many problems and errors may not be
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easily identified with too few participants. As previously stated, laboratory studies
usually recruit a small number of participants to cut costs compared to online studies.
For example, two laboratory studies involved 66 and 51 students at a university,
respectively by [98,99]. In comparison, the numbers of participants in online studies
such as [55] and [56], were 138 and 53, showing that the number of participants may
be doubled in such research. However, participant recruitment takes effort in both
of the mentioned approaches, which in turn may increase the time costs and limit
the potential participant pool in terms of numbers and diversity.
The mentioned issues have led to the identification of a new way for researchers to
gather data from vast number of users on the web cheaply and with low time con-
sumption using micro-task markets. Micro-task markets, also called crowdsourcing
websites, are online platforms allowing micro-tasks to be posted and their solutions
collecting by crowd workers within a few minutes for a small monetary reward [106].
Participant recruitment in crowdsourcing studies rely on the crowdsourcing system
instead of a researcher. The members of crowdsourcing systems who are already
registered as workers can select from a list of small tasks and complete them to earn
their associated fees. For example, Amazons Mechanical Turk offers quick access
to over 400,000 anonymous workers from US and India who are willing to finish
the available tasks at any time for less and equal than 0.10 USD [107]. Part of
one experimental study involved over 541 participants recruited using the MTurk
crowdsourcing website [99].
Although most of the crowdsourcing studies have been successful in obtaining large
volumes of data, quality assurance remains one fundamental challenge [108]. Still,
two studies showed that the wide population of crowdsourcing studies allows results
to be obtained that match the quality of results from an expert population [106,109].
However, there is no guarantee of ecological validity in crowdsourcing studies, like
online studies, due to the impossibility of controlling the experimental setting
completely [106]. Therefore, a lot of bogus responses to crowdsourcing tasks might
be created by dishonest participants or spammers, who will affect the reliability
of the collected data. For example, a study showed a concern over Sybil attacks
on crowdsourcing studies [107]. Here, malicious users create multiple untrusted
identities in order to cause a system failure. Despite the fact that only users with valid
responses are rewarded, the manual detection of such attacks consumes researchers
time and effort [106] .
This issue has been considered in the literature and several solutions have been
proposed to easily reduce or observe invalid responses through the following:
1. A voting system, which rates potential untrustworthy users with a high score,
can be used to filter invalid responses; however, it can be also attacked by
malicious users [107]. Further, it is difficult to rely on users opinion to
distinguish between dishonest and honest users [106].
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2. There are several design recommendations that help to filter the invalid re-
sponses easily, such as adding qualification tests that contain some verifiable
questions in order to recognize dishonest users and spammers [106,107]. To
detect suspicious responses, different parameters can be used such as validating
the short duration of the completed task and/or the redundancy of answers
among various tasks [106]. The task can also be designed to ask the same
question in different places and compare the results to identify inconsistent
responses. Moreover, designing the tasks to be completed accurately and hon-
estly with an effort to avoid random and malicious completion can encourage
users to provide valid responses.
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Chapter 3
User Perception of Password
Ratings
3.1 Introduction
Passwords have been dominating user authentication for more than half a century
and many researchers believe that they will continue as a key part of the user
authentication world in the foreseeable future, despite many security and usability
problems identified and a large number of new user authentication systems proposed
over the years [5, 74].
Security problems of passwords are often caused by insecure behavior of human
users, e.g., it has been well known that many users tend to choose easy-to-remember
passwords which can be exploited by password crackers [13,54,74]. To help users de-
fine stronger passwords, proactive password checkers, also called password (strength)
meters, have been widely deployed to give users feedback while they are creating
passwords in order to influence them not to define weak passwords [81]. Some
password meters have been found effective in leading to stronger passwords in some
scenarios [79,99].
All PPCs show an objective (i.e., computer-generated) rating when a given password
is being entered by the user. Most widely used password meters based on simple
heuristics approach (i.e., password length and composition) to rate a password’s
strength [79]. The objective rating is either a categorical value such as “weak”,
“medium”, and “strong” [110], or a numeric value such as the password entropy [51] or
the estimated guess number/time for the password being cracked [14]. Among these
password meters, zxcvbn [75] seems to use more advanced heuristics to generate
more accurate results.
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More robust password meters, are based on probabilistic techniques in measuring
password resistance to guessing attacks. For example, some of them use Markov
models [9, 65], probabilistic context-free grammars [10,12,14], neural networks [11].
A special class of password checkers show the so-called peer pressure motivator
(PPM), that a password strength estimates relative to the whole set of passwords
chosen by all users [79,82,111]. Such ratings are still objective as they are calculated
based on a computer algorithm, but have a closer link to subjective user perception
of password strength.
Unfortunately, none of these heuristic and probabilistic approaches reflect the real
overall strength of a specific password [68, 69, 99]. This would suggest that objective
ratings may not always provide an accurate guidance to users. This would pose a
question on whether proactive password checkers based on human experts to provide
subjective rating would offer more reliable guidance on passwords’ strength.
We are not aware of any password checker provides subjective ratings to users. This
lack of subjective ratings from password meters leads to the following question: which
one will a user trust if a given password’s objective rating shown by a password
meter differs from the subjective rating commonly perceived by human users (or
one from a human expert)? This is an important question for us to understand
how users perceive objective ratings given by password meters and why (not) they
decide to follow the guidance. Since all human users have their own (correct or not)
subjective judgment on password strength, the influence of such subjective ratings
can play a crucial role in their decision-making process.
To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been properly studied in
the research literature except some work looking at user’s general impression of
objective ratings given by some password meters [79]. To fill this gap, we conducted
a user study with over 1,000 crowd-sourcing workers, leading to some interesting
observations on user’s perceived trust on subjective and objective ratings of password
strength, such as 1) the user’s own subjective perception of password strength could
heavily influence their perceived trust on subjective and objective ratings of password
strength; 2) different users may have different styles of trust perception on subjective
and objective ratings of password strength. The rest of the chapter is organized as
follows. The next section presents some related work, which is followed by a detailed
description of our user study design and data analysis. The last section concludes
the note with future work.
3.2 Related work
We introduce some selected work focusing on users’ perceptions of trust in general
and users’ perceptions around password security including a discussion on the most
relevant studies on passwords. We briefly overview some work on impact of subjective
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and objective ratings on human decision making process.
3.2.1 General Overview on Trust
Trust Definition and Factors
Trust is defined as an individual’s readiness for a vulnerable circumstance as a result
of a positive expectation of others’(trustees’) actions [112]. Trust is affected by three
features of a trustee which commonly appear in the literature: 1) expertise/ability
(i.e., the degree to which a trustee is believed to be competent.), 2) trustworthiness
(i.e., the extent to which a trustee is believed to be cooperative and kind), 3)honesty
(i.e., the degree to which a trustee is believed to have integrity.) [112, 113]. Trust
is also subject to other factors related to personality features and conditional
reasons [112,114].
Types of Trust
Trust is classified into five categories: experience-based, personality-based, cognition-
based, institution-based and calculative-based trust [114]. Experience-based trust
occurs when individuals are familiar with trustees as individuals would have an
intuitive knowledge on trustees’ ability. Personality-based trust refers to individuals’
general inclination to trust, meaning that individuals with high tendency to trust have
higher trust in a trustee with lack of information on the trustee and via versa [112].
Cognition based trust is related to individual’s beliefs, abilities, characteristics that
would contribute to trust propensity. Institution-based trust is when trust is affected
by situational normality (i.e., an expectation that trustee do not do abnormal
activities) or structural assurance (i.e., accreditation, regulation) [114]. Calculative
based trust depends on human rational thinking to evaluate the trustworthiness of a
trustee and the trust risks.
3.2.2 User Perception Around Password Security
Few studies have focused on users’ perceptions of password security. Ur et al. [79]
conducted a large-scale user study with 2,931 crowd-sourcing participants and 14
password meters and collected participants’ opinion on the influence of password
strength meter in creating a stronger password. The study findings showed that
more stringent password meters had performed better in influencing users to define
better passwords, although they had also caused more complaints. Some participants
expressed disagreements, surprise and even anger on objective ratings of some strict
password meters. Participants’ prior experiences have usually an impact on their
impressions of password strength, especially when the impartial rating contravenes
their expectations.
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In another work conducted by Egelman et al. [99], two different password meters were
tested with real passwords used by participants in a lab setting and a field experiment,
and it was observed that the mere presence of a password meter could influence
users to define stronger passwords. This work also led to another observation
that participants knowingly chose weak passwords for unimportant accounts, which
implies that users’ subjective judgment on password strength did play a role in their
decision making process. Sotirakopoulos et al. [82,111] proposed informing password
strength to end users via a peer pressure motivator (PPM). They conducted user
studies to verify if PPM worked, and the results are mixed: PPM did influence
users positively compared with no-meter case, but it did not make any significant
difference compared with other absolute password meters. The PPM meter was also
tested by Egelman et al. [99], with a similar finding in terms of its effectiveness.
Some research has been focused on understanding password creation process from
user’s perspective. Ur et al. [115] conducted a qualitative user study aiming to
understand common password patterns, and also to investigate users’ perception of
password strength using a think-aloud and role-playing scenario methodology. They
observed that although most users have a well-defined password creation strategy,
some misconceptions on password strength, such as adding a digit or a special
character to the end of a password makes it secure, could result in weak passwords.
In addition, the misunderstanding of security advice can also cause misconceptions
of password strength.
Another study on Android graphical unlock patterns involved 384 crowd-participants
and studied users perceptions of the security and usability [116]. Participants
chose between a pair of graphical patterns according to security and memorability
preferences. Their results highlighted users subjective judgment on assessing a
password, suggested that it can be exploited to enhance password meter.
In another more recent work of Ur et al. [86], a quantitative user study was con-
ducted to compare the user’s perception of password strength with the password
actual strength. It was observed that participants had serious misconception on
how to make strong passwords, although in some other cases their perceptions on
strong passwords did match current password-cracking tools. A large variance in
participants’ understanding on password cracking methods was observed, which
suggests that subjective judgment on password strength will be user specific.
3.2.3 Subjective and Objective Ratings Impact
To the best of our knowledge, there is only limited research investigating the impact
of subjective ratings/feedback and objective ratings on decision making, mostly in
the health care, business and marketing literature. For instance, Lynn [117] found
that a subjective message about the rise of venereal disease was trusted more than
an objective message.
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Darley and Smith [118] investigated the effect of message-board persuasion in terms
of subjective messages and/or objective messages in marketing research. The use of
objective messages alone was shown more effective than a subjective message alone,
but the effectiveness of combining both objective and subjective messages did not
differ significantly from the case of an objective message alone. They concluded that
conditions and context are more important factors to be considered.
The most closely-related work in cyber security area is from Chen et al. [119]. They
conducted a user study to examine the impact of risk (negative) and safety (positive)
information summaries of mobile apps on participants’ decisions on app-installation.
Their results imply that valid risk/safety index for mobile apps could potentially
improve users’ app-installation decision.
3.3 User study design
We conducted a within-subjects crowd-sourcing experiment to investigate users’
perceived trust on subjective and objective ratings of password strength 1. In
particular, the user study was designed to answer the following research questions:
• Research Question 1: Is users’ perception of trust on password subjective
and objective ratings partly affected by password’s condition?
• Research Question 2: Is users’ perception of trust on password subjective
and objective ratings partly affected by users’ personality?
• Research Question 3: Is users’ perception of trust on password subjective
and objective ratings partly affected by password’s complexity?
3.3.1 Study Structure
The study was structured in three parts designed to be completed in 8 minutes (see
Appendix A). In the first part, we collected participants’ demographics, including age,
gender, and their computer skill levels. Then, five passwords with their subjective and
objective ratings (see Section 3.3.2) were presented to participants in two separate
sessions. The five passwords were hidden (shown as asterisks) in the first session and
revealed in the next session. In other words, each participant was asked to complete
10 questions on password ratings, half of the questions on hidden passwords and
the other half on clear passwords. The passwords were shown to the participants
1 Mainly, the experiment was designed to investigate users’ perceived trust on subjective and
objective ratings within two contexts (password security and mobile app privacy). The study was
structured in five sessions, excluding the demographics part, and designed to take maximum 20
minutes total. Two sessions are on password strength ratings and three sessions are on mobile app
privacy ratings. To counterbalance the learning effects, participants were randomly divided into two
groups, each group gets password security and app privacy treatment sessions in one of the possible
orders. However, Our focus in this user study is on password security treatment sessions only.
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in the increasing order of their strength, which obtained from the zxcvbn password
strength estimator (see Table 3.1). In addition, participants were asked to answer a
question on password ratings at a time.
Table 3.1: Five passwords used in our experiments and their strength ratings, shown
in 5-point scale.
Passwords
Strength Ratings
Subjective Objective zxcvbnb
password Very Weak Weak Very Weak
password1234 Weak Medium Very Weak
Q2W3E4R5 Medium Good Medium
BankEx02 Good Medium Good
R77a@7FW Good Very Good Very Good
a The 5-point scale of password strength rating was chosen
to be in line with the privacy rating scales used for the
privacy sessions (see Footnote 1).
b zxcvbn (version 3.2.2) [110] was used as reference in
creating the both fake objective and subjective ratings.
In each question, participants were asked to indicate which rating they trusted more.
All password ratings were faked by us (see Section 3.3.2). However, participants
were told that subjective ratings were generated by a group of security experts
while objective ratings were generated by an algorithm developed by a group of
security experts. They had a choice to select among four answer options (“subjective”,
“objective”, “own”, and “undecided” ratings). The ”own” option refers to participants’
disagreement with both subjective and objective ratings while ”undecided” refers to
participants’ inability to make a choice.
Based on participants’ responses to the question on the most trusted rating, they
were asked a follow-up question to provide their reasons behind their selection.
Participants were asked to select the most relative reason to their previous answer.
Hence, they had to select from a set of predefined reasons according to their
previous selected rating option as shown in Table 3.22. Besides, participants had
the opportunity to select “others” to freely define their reasons.
However, to minimize potential learning effect and interference effect, we randomized
the order of all answer options for the main and the follow-up questions (passwords
and reasons questions).
2We extended the list of reasons from participants’ freely defined reasons in a conducted pilot
user study.
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Table 3.2: Predefined answers for users’ reasons behind each choice of rating.
Choices ID Reason Options
Objective
O1 Software can detect hidden things which users cannot.
O2 Users often tend to make mistakes while software is more accu-
rate.
O3 I do not trust subjective rating as I think not all users have a
good experience in the field.
O4 I selected that rating because it matches my expectation.
O5 I selected the lower rating to be safe.
O6 I used my own experience/knowledge to make a judgment.
O7 Others.
Subjective
O8 I trust users because software cant predict new form of attacks.
O9 Applications are created by human, so it is better to trust user
rating.
O10 I think software can produce a misleading rating since software
might be compromised or not designed well.
O11 I selected that rating because it matches my expectation.
O12 I selected the lower rating to be safe.
O13 I used my own experience/knowledge to make a judgment.
O14 Others.
Own
O15 None of the two ratings match my expectation.
O16 I consider both options in addition to my experience to form
my own rating.
O17 Others
Undecided
O18 I need more details to make a proper decision.
O19 Others.
3.3.2 Our Choice of Passwords
Table 3.1 lists the five passwords used in this study. The table also shows our
faked subjective and objective ratings of each password in comparison to its genuine
impartial rating reference. The passwords with their both forged ratings were created
under several considerations, which are discussed below.
Different Passwords’ Categories
The passwords were carefully selected to represent different composition rules and
levels of strength. The passwords represent divergent password categories: dictionary-
based (i.e., password), hybrid-based (i.e., password1234), keyboard pattern (i.e.,
Q2W3E4R5), pass phrases (i.e., BankEx02) and random password (i.e., R77a@7FW).
Each category represents different levels of password complexity which in turn ensure
passwords with different levels of strength (from very weak to very good).
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Different Subjective and Objective Ratings
The subjective and objective strength ratings of each password are mock and intuitive.
This is mainly because there are no available subjective strength ratings of passwords
and none of the existing password strengths metering provide an accurate evaluation
of password strength, as discussed earlier.
Regardless of any possible points of disagreement with the selected ratings, our
faked passwords’ ratings are still reasonable to some extent. Firstly, we decided to
consider only the case when subjective and objective ratings are different. In this
case, participants will have to make a choice based on the rating value and type.
We also tried to ensure a logical difference between subjective and objective ratings.
Hence, both ratings corresponding to a password are one-point difference on 5-point
scale. This would control the potential effect of having illogical rating, which may
raise doubts about the credibility of the user study. Consequently, users may make
random choices. We also want to have a different pair of rating for each password to
produce a more uniform distribution of passwords’ ratings.
Rules in Crafting Subjective and Objective Ratings
In the creation of password ratings, we used zxcvbn [110] as reference to generate
reasonable objective and subjective ratings. zxcvbn was chosen because it has been
considered to be relatively sufficient in giving an objective estimation of password
strength [75]. Our faked ratings were produced according to the following principles.
• Principle 1: To assign the strength rating obtained from zxcvbn to subjective
ratings unless the assigned rating is the highest point in the scale or not
reasonable.
• Principle 2: To assign a higher strength rating point to zxcvbn ratings to
objective ratings unless the assigned rating is not reasonable.
As password metrics including “zxcvbn” may underestimate the real-world passwords’
strength since they are based on a single cracking algorithm [68], we think the objec-
tive rating of the five passwords should be higher than zxcvbn ratings (Principle
1 ) where the subjective ratings should remain relatively the same (Principle 2 ).
Therefore, the objective rating of each password was assigned to a higher rating point
to zxcvbn ratings. However, for some cases such as “BankEx02” and “R77a@7FW”
the above rule cannot be applied. For “BankEx02”, it is rated as excellent by zxcvbn.
Even though, we think that setting the objective rating of “BankEx02” to “medium”
rather than “very good” may be more rational for two reasons. One reason for this is
we cannot say “R77a@7FW” and “BankEx02” objective ratings can be equivalent if
we rate them very high. We also do not want to rate it “good” since this will result
in not having a uniform distribution of ratings. For “R77a@7FW”, zxcvbn assesses
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it as “very good” which is the highest rating point in the rating scale. Nevertheless,
we cannot assign “very good” to the subjective rating since objective ratings should
be higher than subjective ratings according to the above first principle.
Similarly, the first principle cannot be applied for some passwords such as ‘R77a@7FW”
(already explained above) and “password1234”. For “password1234”, its rated as
very weak by zxcvbn which is the lowest rating point in the 4-point scale. However,
as “password1234” has 2 weak segments which are in the top passwords list in [120],
the password may be rated subjectively or objectively higher than very weak.
3.3.3 Recruitment
We only used CrowdFlower crowdsourcing platform [121] to recruit participants in our
study. Each participant was rewarded 0.16$ for the study, which approximately took
several minutes for most of the participants to complete. We limited participation
to the most trusted workers (noted as ’Level 3’ in CrowdFlower platform) to ensure
data quality. We also collected data in different days and times to ensure wide
population.
3.3.4 Quality Assessment
As we obtained our results from a crowd-sourcing platform, strategies are needed to
achieve reliable data. In other words, outliers detection is essential to ensure data
quality. Outliers would refer to as anomalies, inconsistencies and deviants in data.
Our detection strategies can be divided into two stages, one stage preformed before
collecting the data, and the second stage is done after data collection.
The first stage of outliers detection is an up-front filtering to prevent dishonest
participants from being involved in our tasks. This was automatically handled by
CrowdFlower based on trust annotation which has been obtained from a group of
trusted annotators or/and from participants’(workers’) performance in their previous
jobs/tasks.
Nevertheless, the second detection stage was conducted after collecting the data to
verify the reliability of users’ answers. We identified suspicious results by devising
three checking rules.
1. Exclude uncompleted tasks from our results. In this approach, we ensured
that all participants gave answers to all task questions in both password and
apps sessions.
2. Exclude tasks which were completed in unreasonable time. In this approach, we
should calculate the average time the task took to complete by all participants.
Then, use this to define a threshold value which determine the allowed time
difference between an individual task and the average task completion for all
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participants. Although this would allow to detect bots activity if a task is
completed in unreasonable time (especially when the task completion time is
very low). However, we might miss some outliers who completed the task within
or larger than the average time. For example, some participants (workers)
maybe worked in several tasks in rotation which would give the feeling that
they spent more times on an individual task than they did in reality.
3. Exclude unreasonable/conflicted answers3. In this approach, we were looking
for participants which their choice of ratings deviated from their given reasons.
In other words, we checked whether a participant has one or more unreasonable
reason behind their choice of password (i.e., users selected the higher password
rating and they reported that they selected the lower rating to be in a safe
side as a reason behind their previous selection). Then, participants who have
such conflict answers were excluded from the data analysis.
This approach would be very sensitive to a small margin of error in the
observations. In other words, the above approach would exclude participants,
which are not necessarily outliers since they may have a single or two conflict
answers which could be done by mistake. Such human errors would be expected
and should not degrade the trustworthiness of their responses as the mistake
would happen without intention. Therefore, it would be worthy of consideration
to not exclude those who did few errors. Then, this would require to calculate
the average human error rate and use this to determinate the threshold value
of human error.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Participants
In total 1,272 participants4 from 73 countries took part in our user study. 70 of
them did not complete all questions, so they were considered as outliers and not
3These answers refer to participants’ answers which are related to a password where there is a
conflict between participants’ choice of rating and their given reasons. For example, assume that
a participant chose “ob” rating as a trusted ratings for “password12345” and “O5” as a reason
for their selection. the participant’s answers in this case are conflicted as the objective rating
for “password12345” is higher than the subjective rating and the participant’s given reason is
unreasonable.
4Our sample size is larger than the minimum number of subjects required (N = 230), suggesting
that our sample size is large enough to get unbiased estimates as well as detecting a true effect when
there is an effect. The minimum sample size (N = 230) was determined according to Hosmer et al.’s
sample size guidelines for multinomial logit regression [122]. They suggest a minimum of 10 subjects
per independent variable to achieve empirical validity. Thus, we need at least (N = 10× number of
predictors). Hence, the minimum sample size will be 230 (N = 10× (2 + 5 + 4 + 5 + 5 + 2)) if we
have 6 independent variables: 1) password display condition with two levels (displayed, hidden); 2)
passwords with 5 levels; 3) personality groups with 4 levels; 4) ages with 5 levels; 5) skills with 5
levels; and 6) gender with 2 levels.
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Frequency
249 (21%)
375 (31%)
232 (19%)
147 (12%)
137 (11%)
62 (5%)
>=36
26-37
<=25
Female
Male
(a) Age
106 (9%)67 (6%)
118 (10%) 393 (33%)
155 (13%) 343 (29%)
Very good
Good
Ok
Poor
Very poor
11 (1%)
3 (0%)1 (0%)
5 (0%)
Frequency
Female
Male
(b) Computer skill levels
Figure 3.1: Age (a) and computer skill levels (b) distribution of participants based
on their gender
used for our analysis. Therefore, we have 1272− 70 = 1202 valid participants in our
final data.
The male-female ratio is 71:29. Table 3.1 shows participants distribution by age,
computer skill levels according to their gender. In terms of age, the participants
have a reasonable age range: 18-25 (24.1%), 26-35 (42.6%), 36-45 (23.7%), over 45
(9.2%), and below 18 (0.3%). Due to the relatively small number of participants
in the last two age groups, we re-grouped participants into three groups to have a
more even distribution: 25 or below (294 participants), 26-35 (512 participants), 36
or older (396 participants). In terms of the participants’ computer skill levels, the
proportion of participants who have poor knowledge on computers is diminutive with
2% participants (20:1202). In contrast, the majority (84%) have strong knowledge
on computers.
Each participant provided answers to 10 questions on password rating’s trust. For
the four candidate answers to each question, we define 2-character shortcuts to be
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used in the rest of the note: “su” for “subjective rating”, “ob” for “objective rating”,
“ow” for “own rating”, and “ud” for “undecided”.
In addition, each participant gave one or more reasons behind their choice of trusted
ratings. Their answers were used to further clean our data from outliers. We found
that 294 (24.5%) participants provide at least a single conflicted reason with their
selected trusted ratings. Hence, the number of reliable participants are reduced to
908.
This work is based entirely on an analysis of the data obtained from the 1202
participants. To obtain more accurate results, our data analysis was repeated using
the data of the 908 participants. However, the results do not show major differences.
In this section, we report the analysis of participants’ behaviors in terms of password
conditions and password composition. We also present our finding related to
participants’ justifications of trust rating.
3.4.2 Session-level Behavioral Analysis
Here, we study the general patterns of behavior that emerge at condition levels
(sessions’ level). In other words, we want to study the manipulation effect of different
password conditions as an independent variable (IV) on users’ trust perception as
a dependent variable (DV). This would highlight any changes in users’ behavior
before and after showing them clear passwords. Hence, we care more on knowing
how many times each participant chose “su” and “ob” answer options as the remain
answer options (”ow” and ”ud”) are not directly related to user’s perceived trust
on subjective and objective ratings. In our analysis, we take into consideration
collective and group behavior in respect of password conditions.
Collective Behavioral Analysis
This analysis focuses on understanding the overall behavioral differences in varied
password contexts. To visualize the collective behavior, we produced 3-D histograms
of participants’ behavioral pattern for both hidden- and clear-password sessions as
shown in Figure 3.2, where a cell in the 3-D histogram at position (i, j) indicates
the number of participants who chose “su” i times and “ob” j times (0 ≤ i+ j ≤ 5).
Each cell in the 3-D histogram denotes an individual behavioral pattern, and the
whole histogram shows the collective behavior of all participants.
Figure 3.2 clearly shows that the collective behavior changed significantly. When the
passwords were hidden, more participants chose “ob” than “su”. Nevertheless, once
the passwords were disclosed part of the participants tended to migrate their trust
of objective rating towards other choice combinations between subjective rating
and objective rating, which causes a more chaotic behavior pattern as shown in
Figure 3.2 (b).
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Objective “ob” Subjective “su”
(a) Hidden passwords
Objective “ob” Subjective “su”
(b) Displayed passwords
Figure 3.2: 3-D distribution of user choice on “su” and “ob”.
Although the difference between the two 3-D histograms is clearly visible, multinomial
logistic regression was used to examine if there is a significant relationship between
the dependent variables of trustworthiness and the passwords’ condition. This
statistical method has been widely used to test data when the dependent variable is
multinominal, which is our case. The value of “ob” selected as the reference point in
the regression analysis. Overall, the analysis revealed that the observed difference
is also statistically significant (see Table 3.3). The analysis also shows that the
subjective ratings when passwords were hidden were 80% less likely to be picked
over objective ratings in relative to the displayed passwords. On the other hand,
choosing of “ud” over “ob” occurred 34% when the passwords were hidden was more
than when they were displayed.
Table 3.3: Multinomial logistic regression models exploring significant effect of
password conditions on perceived trust on subjective and objective ratings.
Predictor b SE p-value Odds Ratio
Conditiona,b
Hidden ow vs ob -0.160 0.051 0.002 ** 0.852
su vs ob -0.227 0.043 1.260e-07 *** 0.797
ud vs ob 0.294 0.071 3.345e-05 *** 1.342
a
χ2 = 66.607 (p < 0.001), McFadden R2 : 0.0022165.
b The reference password condition is “Displayed” and the reference password rating is “ob”.
c Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1.
Group Behavioral Analysis
It would be interesting to understand the complex observed behavior among a group
of individuals. To achieve this, participants’ behaviors were discussed below under
different classification of groups.
Firstly, participants are classified based on their willingness to trust one of the ratings.
We are mainly interested in the migration behavior of participants who placed full
47
(a) Group A’s behavior with Hidden passwords (b) Group A’s behavior with Displayed passwords
(c) Group B’s behavior with Hidden passwords (d) Group B’s behavior with Displayed passwords
Figure 3.3: Migration behavior for two Groups in different two contexts/conditions.
Group A refers to participants who chose 5/5 ’su’ for all Hidden passwords. Group
B refers to the users who chose 5/5 ’ob’ for all Hidden passwords.
trust in either subjective rating (Group A) or objective ratings (Group B) of hidden
passwords. Figure 3.3 (c) shows Group B has 197 participants and Figure 3.3 (a)
shows Group A included 83 participants. The number of participants in Group B
was reduced to the half. However, 39% of the Group B’s (75/194 participants)
behavior remained changeless in distinct conditions. For Group A, the number of
participants was reduced by 16% for disclosed password and 53% of Group A’s
(44/83 participants) behavior remained unchanged in different password conditions.
Surprisingly, around 2% (22/1202) of the participants did not put trust in neither
subjective nor objective ratings of hidden and displayed passwords.
In Figure 3.2 (a), it demonstrates that there are four peaks where each would refer
to different type of personality upon trust when there is a lack of information. This
led us to run a k-means clustering algorithm to compute the clusters. The output
shows four clusters with centroids of {3.4,0.9}, {1.4,2.4}, {0.7,0.4} and {0.2,4.4}.
The cluster centers’ values were rounded up, as shown in Figure 3.4. However,
the clustering results are shown in Figure 3.4 similar to the observations from
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Figure 3.4: Four clusters of personality in terms of their choice on “su” and “ob”. N
refers to the number of participants of a cluster.
Figure 3.2 (a).
To evaluate the effect of the personality groups and their interaction with conditions
on participants’ behavior, we conducted another multinomial logit regression. Esti-
mates for personalities’ effect are given in Table 3.45. The outcomes indicate that the
overall effect of all predictors is statistically significant (χ2 = 4727.8 (p < 2.22e−16)).
It also reports that group “P2”, “P3” and “P4” are more likely than “P1” to prefer
subjective rating over objective ratings when the condition variable is controlled.
The same analysis was conducted for various personality baselines, and the results
indicate that there is a significant difference between other pairs of personality in
perceiving trust on password subjective and objective ratings.
Estimating the interaction effect between the factor of personality and condition
are also given in the table. The result shows that this is besides significant. For
hidden passwords, the odds ration of participants in the three groups (P2, P3 and
P4) relative to P1 is 10.652, 49.459 and 3.452 respectively. This means that the
selection of subjective ratings in group P3 is expected to be higher than the selection
of subjective ratings in group P1.
Such interaction between persons would be easily explained by graphs. Figure 3.5
shows a comparison among participants’ choices of trusted ratings based on their
personality. Figure 3.5 (a) shows participants’ rating preferences with a hidden
password while their rating preference with a clear password is shown in Figure 3.5
(a). Clearly, participants’ answers are affected by password conditions.
5We used mlogit package for R to do the estimation of the multinomial logit models via calling
mlogit(formula = ratings 1|condition ∗ person, data = database, reflevel = ”ob”). In the table,
each row represents a linear prediction model for predicting the probability to select one of the
dependent variable categories knowing some independent variables. The prediction equation is
ln
(
p(y)
p(ob)
)
= β0 + β1 × x where y is the dependent variable rating, and y ∈ {ow, su, ud}. The
intercept β0 is associated with a particular y and the coefficient β1 is associated with a particular
predictor variable x and a particular y. x is the independent variable.
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Table 3.4: Multinomial logistic regression models exploring significant effect of
password conditions and personality on perceived trust on subjective and objective
ratings.
Predictora b SE p-value Odds Ratio
Condition [baseline = Displayed]
Hidden ow vs ob -1.950 0.201 <2.20E-16 *** 0.142
su vs ob -2.019 0.144 <2.20E-16 *** 0.133
ud vs ob -1.646 0.316 1.94E-07 *** 0.133
Person [baseline = P1]
P2 ow vs ob 1.804 0.103 <2.20E-16 *** 6.071
su vs ob 1.401 0.081 <2.20E-16 *** 4.058
ud vs ob 1.923 0.168 <2.20E-16 *** 6.845
P3 ow vs ob 1.007 0.173 5.79E-09 *** 2.737
su vs ob 2.218 0.113 <2.20E-16 *** 9.190
ud vs ob 0.101 0.39 0.7967 1.106
P4 ow vs ob 1.311 0.114 <2.20E-16 *** 3.712
su vs ob 0.835 0.093 <2.20E-16 *** 2.304
ud vs ob 1.605 0.181 <2.20E-16 *** 4.977
Condition×Person
Hidden×P2 ow vs ob 2.365 0.217 <2.20E-16 *** 10.640
su vs ob 2.366 0.162 <2.20E-16 *** 10.652
ud vs ob 2.614 0.332 3.55E-15 *** 13.653
Hidden×P3 ow vs ob 2.076 0.402 2.45E-07 *** 7.973
su vs ob 3.901 0.252 <2.20E-16 *** 49.459
ud vs ob 3.340 0.612 4.92E-08 *** 28.219
Hidden×P4 ow vs ob 1.917 0.225 <2.20E-16 *** 6.798
su vs ob 1.239 0.178 3.12E-12 *** 3.452
ud vs ob 1.658 0.345 1.53E-06 *** 5.248
a
χ2 = 4727.8 (p < 2.22e− 16), McFadden R2 : 0.15733.
b Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1.
We also conducted a logit regression analysis to test possible distinctions between
collective behaviors for different genders, ages, and skills. The results indicate that
none of the three factors play a role in participants’ perceived trust on subjective
and objective ratings of password strength.
3.4.3 Password-level behavioral analysis
In the previous subsection, we looked at the session-level behavior of participants
where their answers to five questions in each session are summed up. It is then
interesting to look at their question-level behavior to see if they behaved differently
to different passwords and subjective-objective rating combinations.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of participants’ answers according their personality type.
The five passwords we used all have distinct subjective-objective rating combinations,
so we decided to check whether participants’ collective behavior depends on the
password/subjective-objective rating combination. In the following, we use PW1,
PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 to refer to the five passwords (top to down) listed in
Table 3.1. Since our concern here is participants’ collective behavior (in terms of the
tendency to choose each of the four answer options), we want to see if the distribution
of responses’ shifts significantly when the password changed, therefore, we again
used multinomial logit regression method to conduct our analysis. In Table 3.5, the
results of four regression models on different password pairs are given. In each model,
a different password is used as a baseline. As we are more interested in the effect of
passwords on selecting either subjective or objective ratings, the table includes only
the comparison between subjective and objective outcomes in each pair of passwords.
The results of models as a whole are significance, χ2 = 282.54 (p < 2.22e− 16).
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Table 3.5: Results of four multinomial logit regression on different password baselines
and one observation (subjective ratings vs objective ratings).
Model 1b b SE P OR Model 2b b SE P OR
PW2 vs PW1 0.091 0.099 0.357 1.095 PW1 vs PW2 -0.091 0.099 0.357 0.913
PW3 vs PW1 -0.682 0.097 0.000 0.505 PW3 vs PW2 -0.773 0.097 0.000 0.461
PW4 vs PW1 -0.537 0.097 0.000 0.584 PW4 vs PW2 -0.628 0.097 0.000 0.534
PW5 vs PW1 -0.915 0.097 0.000 0.400 PW5 vs PW2 -1.006 0.097 0.000 0.366
Model 3b b SE P OR Model 4b b SE P OR
PW2 vs PW3 0.773 0.097 0.000 2.167 PW3 vs PW4 -0.145 0.095 0.128 0.865
PW1 vs PW3 0.682 0.097 0.000 1.978 PW2 vs PW4 0.628 0.097 0.000 1.874
PW4 vs PW3 0.145 0.095 0.128 1.156 PW1 vs PW4 0.537 0.097 0.000 1.711
PW5 vs PW3 -0.233 0.095 0.015 0.792 PW5 vs PW4 -0.378 0.095 0.000 0.685
a
χ2 = 282.54 (p < 2.22e− 16), McFadden R2 : 0.0094019.
b Model 1 [baseline = PW1], Model 2 [baseline = PW2], Model 3 [baseline = PW3], Model 4 [baseline = PW4],the reference
of password rating is “ob”.
Observing the results in Table 3.5 we can see that for the password pair PW1 and
PW2, password pair PW3 and PW4 and password pair PW3 and PW5, there is
no important difference in participants’ collective behavior. Nevertheless, there is
a significant difference for other password pairs. When the condition variable is
control, participants were more likely to choose subjective ratings over objective
ratings for PW2 in relative to PW1 while the occurrences of the prior expectation
were low for other passwords in comparison with PW1. For PW2, the likelihood
of subjective rating being selected more than objective rating is expected to be
always higher, compared to the other passwords. For PW3 in comparison to PW5,
the occurrences of subjective rating to objective ratings are high. However, the
subjective ratings are expected to be less likely to be chosen for PW3, compared to
the other passwords.
These results can be seen also visually in Figure 3.6. The figure shows percentages
of participants’ answers for each of the four options and for all the five passwords. In
Figure 3.6 (a), it is clearly that participants had a convergence of views in terms of
trust when passwords were hidden. It also shows that when passwords’ complexity is
increased participants are more likely to trust objective ratings over subjective ratings.
However, this is not the case when passwords are clear as shown in Figure 3.6 (a).
It is obvious that displaying passwords play a role in the users’ perception of trust.
Both the above regression tests and visual inspection of Figure 3.6 (b) lead to the
same observation that the five passwords can obviously be put into two groups: 1)
PW1 and PW2 (more participants chose to trust subjective ratings); 2) PW3, PW4
and PW5 (more participants chose to trust objective ratings).
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Figure 3.6: Percentages of participants’ answers for all five passwords when they are
hidden and displayed.
3.4.4 Reasons of trust analysis
Here, the reasons of trust which given by the participants are presented. In our
analysis of their reasons, the data of participants’ who had a conflicted reason with
their choice of ratings were excluded from our analysis.
Figure 3.7 shows a comparison among the percentage of reasons given for each
password in different contexts. Each reason is labeled with a different number (see
Table 3.2) and color. In general, 28% of participants selected “O1” as a reason
for trusting objective ratings. “O2”, “O4” and “O6” were the next higher selected
reasons (1˜9%). For subjective ratings, “O8” (22%), “O12” (19%), and “O9”(17%)
are the selected reasons.
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Figure 3.7: Percentages of users’ reasons behind their trust on password ratings.
The reasons behind selecting objective, subjective, own and undecided ratings are
colored with blue, purple, green and orange respectively.
3.5 Discussions
This section discusses our findings in the previous section. The discussion is divided
into three main points, each point for answering one of our research questions,
mentioned earlier.
Context affects on users’ trust
Context has a large effect in users’ perceived trust in the subjective and objective
ratings of password strength. Our findings show a significant shift of collective
behavior when password context is changed. This clear shift can be considered as a
direct evidence of the significant participants’ engagement in the user study. This
might show that conducting users’ studies on the crowd seems to be feasible to some
extend.
In addition, users tend to trust objective rating more than subjective rating when
the password is hidden. Some users explained that objective rating would become a
better rating choice because it rated by software, which is more sensitive in detecting
risk and accurate in estimating risks. It shows that users’ own subjective judgments
on password strength played an active role in their perceived trust on both subjective
and objective ratings, especially when they are supplied with more information. This
is more obvious when passwords are shown.
The majority of participants have their own judgment of password strength when
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the password is disclosed. This would be explained by the fact that some people
would have a strong institution-based and personalized-based trust, which explained
earlier. This fact is also supported by our findings where users showed willingness to
select the rating which matches their expectation. This would mean they partially
rely on one solution (type of rating) when its output matches their expectations.
Personality affects on users’ trust
Users’ personality would also have an impact on trust prescription. Some users
founded to be conservative and cautious when it comes to trusting a type of rating.
This would also mean that password rating would also have an influence on perceiving
trust. Some of them preferred to pick the lower rating to be in the safe side.
Surprisingly, few users resist establishing trust under any circumstance to third
party. A high assumption of this could be associated with trust bias. In other words,
for some participants they commonly are not willing to trust any solutions in most
cases, regardless of situation that would engage doing so. In contrast, some users
had an extreme trust on either subjective or objective ratings.
Our findings show the personality effect is more obvious when the password is hidden,
However, the effect would be reduced when the condition change. Unexpectedly,
the effect of skills, age and gender were not founded to have a great influence on
users’ trust. This could be associated with the effect of an unbalanced population
sampling for gender and skills, which is one of the study limitations. However, this
is not the case for the age population of our sample.
Passwords affects on users’ trust
We observed that the complexity and structure of password have an obvious effect
on users’ trust. This was observable when different displayed passwords received
different trust responses.
A possible explanation for this might be that participant can easily make a judgment
when passwords have a simple structure which would lead them to select the
subjective ratings as they almost assigned lower rating to passwords. For example,
PW1 (“password”) and PW2 (“password1234”), and their objective rating are
both one-level higher than their subjective ratings (“Weak” vs. “Very Weak” and
“Medium” vs. “Weak”). Clearly, the objective ratings seem to be a bit higher than
they should be since “password” is the most frequently-used password (No. 1 in
the top passwords list in [120]), and “password1234” is a simple combination of
passwords “password” and “1234” (No. 4 in the top passwords list in [120]). The
fact that more participants chose to trust subjective ratings for PW1 and PW2 can
then be explained by the perceived disagreement between some participants’ own
subjective judgment and the objective rating (or their agreement with the subjective
rating).
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However, this is not the case when password structure become more complicated,
which would contribute to trusting of objective ratings. For PW3 (“Q2W3E4R5”),
PW4 (“BankEx02”) and PW5 (“R77a@7FW”), both subjective and objective ratings
seem similarly reasonable. If this was what most of our participants felt during the
user study, then we could consider their bias towards objective ratings as indirect
evidence that they had a good level of perceived trust on password meters (or
computer programs) so tended to say they trust objective ratings when there is an
agreement (so there might be an element of confirmation bias). Otherwise, this
could be interpreted differently since users’ trust would be contributed to their lack
of information in which they would select the objective rating when they cannot
make a decision.
Some people might argue that the objective rating for password “Q2W3E4R5” is
overrated as it corresponds to a simple graphic pattern on a QWER-keyboard.
However, it depends on how sensitive the users are to graphical representation of
a keyboard. This is related to individual’s cognitive style. As reported in [123],
an important cognitive style for a person is the verbal/imager dimension. An
individual with a verbal dimension can perform efficiently with content presented
in the form of text, and an individual with an imager dimension prefers to process
information in the combination of graphical and textual representation. More
participants chose to trust objective rating of “Good” instead of subjective rating of
“Medium” for “Q2W3E4R”, which indicates that not all participants can associate
PW3 with graphical representation of a keyboard. The textual representation or
textual meaning seems to be more important for participants to make their judgment
of password strength.
By looking at participants’ responses across all passwords, there seems to be a general
pattern that participants tend to trust the rating of weaker password strength when
the password contains a meaningful word (both “password” and “password1234”
include password, and the latter one contains 1234. “BankEx02” contains bank).
This might partially reflect the user’s strategy of judging the password strength
for a given password, where a meaningful word in a password is considered as the
indicator of weaker password strength.
3.6 Limitations
Here, the design setting of the user study is revisited. The main weakness with this
setting is attributed to set of factors, which are discussed below.
Our choice of passwords and their subjective and objective ratings impose serious
limitation. Users’ trust would be impacted by many factors [112,114]. Some may be
hard to control and cannot be covered in a single-user study. These factors would
include perception of password strength, password length, password composition,
password categories, user’s demographics, users’ brand loyalty (i.e., people may
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trust rating obtained from a specific well-known password metric or from a trusted
security community), contexts where passwords are used, etc.
The generalizability of our study findings may be restricted to our use of passwords
or/and strength ratings. The used passwords may not be representative of any
larger password population. Besides, users’ perception of trust to either subjective
or objective rating can be impacted by an individuals prior skills and knowledge in
password security. All of these would play a significant role in participation bias
towards one of the ratings. Thus a large set of passwords is needed in this case.
Furthermore, the strength ratings might influence users’ perception. Therefore, we
have to consider this factor to analyze users’ behavior accurately. This requires to
determine an accurate evaluation of password strength. This may be hard to be
indicated for both subjective and objective ratings since there is no perfect objective
estimator, and no available subjective ratings obtained from security experts.
As we discussed before, the session-level behavioral analysis implies that it is more
likely most participants were not cheating. One question that needs to be raised,
however, is whether participants who did not change their answers for both password
sessions were really actively engaged. Although there is a possibility of cheating,
there is no clue about the actual number of cheating or misunderstanding to our
questions. This intrinsic problem could be attributed to the use of a crowdsourcing
platform.
3.7 Conclusion
To sum up, our main findings include: 1) users’ perceived trust on subjective and
objective ratings of password strength is heavily influenced by users’ own subjective
judgments; 2) users’ perceived trust is not influenced by their personal characteristics
such as gender and age; 3) users’ perceived trust on objective ratings drops when their
subjective judgments conflict with the objective ratings; 4) users have a (slightly)
higher tendency to trust objective ratings when their subjective judgments match
the objective ratings.For the second finding, we hypothesize that other personal
characteristics could play a role in users’ perceived trust subjective and objective
ratings of password strength, which we plan to investigate in the future.
Our user study did also produce some more surprising results. Particularly, the
lack of observed effects of gender, age and skills for the session and password level
behavior is totally unexpected. While we could speculate a number of possible
explanations, the results imply that users’ perceived trust and their knowledge on
passwords are more complicated than we previously thought. We plan to design
some more user studies to investigate these remaining questions further.
Although the reported work is about password strength only, we actually also
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conducted a similar study on subjective and objective privacy ratings of mobile apps.
Our initial results showed participants’ collective behavior differs from the password
case, which let us to believe that the application context matters. We are currently
conducting a larger-scale user study with 2,000+ crowdsourcing workers and two
contexts (passwords and mobile apps), in order to investigate the contextual factor
more. We also hope that the new user study will provide a second validation of the
results reported in this note.
Given the observation that a significant number of participants chose to trust
subjective ratings only, introducing subjective ratings into password meters may
be useful at least for some users. Such subjective ratings can be collected based
on a human-based computation approach where human users are encouraged to
submit their own subjective ratings when they disagree with the password meter’s
objective ratings, which can be pooled in a way to keep only reliable ones from real
experts and then the average rating can be shown to users together with the normal
objective ratings. In addition, such subjective ratings gathered from human experts
could be used as useful training data to improve password meters by fixing errors
and producing more reliable objective ratings.
In the future, we aim to refine the current study design to get more accurate results
and obtain a better generalization to our study. Although the design structure
will remain as the current design, our selection of passwords will be refined to
overcome the discussed limitations in the existing design. The updated design will
add additional session where passwords will be hidden while their categories will
be shown. This would allow to observe more the effect of password categories on
the perception of trust. In other words, we will consider different factors, including
passwords’ selection, types, ratings.
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Chapter 4
Password Security Visualizer
(PSV)
4.1 Introduction
Although PPCs are useful, as we see from literature review and our work in Chapter 3
users have complicated behaviors in how they choose passwords and what they trust
in terms of password strength ratings. This suggests rather than focusing on PPCs
a better approach may be to find better ways to educate users so that they can
understand security better thus make more informed decisions. As a matter of fact,
the educational effect of PPCs has not been well studied so we decided to look at
how PPCs can be generalized to a password security education tool, which led to
propose Password Security Visualizer (PSV).
PSV is an interactive visualization system specifically designed for password security
education. PSV extends the main concepts behind all PPCs to a reconfigurable
“box” containing different proactive password checkers and other non-PPC tools
for visualizing useful information around the security of a given password, where
“reconfigurable” refers to the capability of adding new PPCs into and removing
existing ones from the PSV “box”. Although being designed as an educational tool,
PSV can still be used like a normal PPC, with much richer information about the
security of the given password. To some extent, in addition to being a password
security education tool, PSV can also be seen a “many in one” or “hybrid” PPC 1.
At the user interface (UI) level, PSV can be designed in many different ways, two
of which will be explained in this chapter. Using purely client-side Web-based
1We originally developed PSV as Visual Password Checker (VPC) [124], which was later
extended/renamed to be more education-oriented rather than yet another PPC.
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technologies, we implemented one possible PSV design as an open-source software
tool on a 2-D animated canvas. We followed some educational principles to design
and implement PSV, so we hoped it can be a greater potential to achieve its goals
of educating users.
Our PSV prototype provides new key features that cannot be found in existing
PPCs include:
1. displaying different aspects of the security of a given password using different
visual metaphors including but not limited to password strength;
2. making use of a 2-D space to present richer information in a more structural
manner;
3. incorporating multiple PSMs/PPCs in a single UI;
4. supporting password dictionaries and an open interface for adding user-defined
dictionaries;
5. supporting various character transformation rules commonly used by users to
form passwords (e.g., ‘s’ to ‘$’ and ‘l’ to ‘1’);
6. supporting personalized dictionaries constructed through social media account
of the user;
7. displaying even more detailed information about each aspect of password
security as interactive tool-tips.
In addition, as a pure client-side tool our PSV prototype can be easily integrated
into any web site with minimum changes to the HTML pages. While being much
more complicated than any existing PPCs, our PSV prototype has been reasonably
optimized to run fairly fast and can interact with users in real time.
We conducted a set of user studies to evaluate the actual performance of the PSV
prototype. Since there are not many other password security education tools and
PPCs do have a side feature of educating users about password security, we decided
to compare our PSV prototype’s performance with three different designs of existing
PPCs.
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. In the next section we discuss design
considerations of PSV, and then gives details on the web-based PSV prototype
system. Next, we explain our conducted user studies. The final section concludes
the chapter with further discussions and future work.
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4.2 Design Considerations
Our overall aim for PSV is to help enhance users’ overall understanding of password
security, based on what we have learned from existing PPCs and other password
security tools with an educational effect. This lets us to reflect about what users
truly need if we want to educate them about password security, eventually leading us
to design PSV as a system going beyond password checking. Our main design goals
for PSV include: (1) to help users gain more knowledge and have less confusions
on all aspects of password security, including but not limited to password strength,
(2) to highlight the complexity of password security by externalizing inconsistencies
between different PPCs and more advanced attacks on passwords; (3) to engage
users actively so that the process of learning is enjoyable, (4) to produce an open
system that can be easily executed and customized by users on different platforms.
To achieve those design goals, we decided to follow some well-established design
principles to design and implement PSV. In the following, we will discuss those
design principles, which will be followed by two example designs and a discussion on
some key supporting algorithms running in the background.
4.2.1 Design Principles
For designing PSV, we followed a number of widely-recognized principles across
different application domains [125, 126], including cyber security [127]. Here, we
explain all these principles and discuss how we considered them for PSV.
Informative feedback: This principle aims to provide users with essential and
sufficient information to make more informed decisions [125]. This has been observed
for many simple PPCs where users only see a single rating of the given password
without any further information on why the password is rated as such and what to do
to improve. Therefore, supporting users with more informative feedback could help
raise their awareness on password security and correct any misconceptions, which
in turn will help them to make better security-related decisions such as choosing a
stronger password.
The informative feedback PSV can provide include different aspects of password
security such as the following (but not limited to these) categories: (1) basic password
attributes such as length, types of characters used, and structural information e.g.
repeated patterns or character transformation rules, (2) risks against simple and
advanced dictionary-based attacks, and (3) an overall password strength like what
is given by a typical PPCs or PSM. For the third category, it will be beneficial to
show estimates from multiple PPCs and PSMs to inform users about the complexity
and limitations around the overall password strength estimation, thus educating
them that they should not blindly follow an arbitrary PPC or PSM. Being able to
understand the complexity and limitations will also help them become less confused
when they enter such inconsistent ratings of different PPCs/PSMs. PSV will thus
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include a number of Password Information Units (PIUs), each showing one aspect of
password security.
While offering more information is in general helpful, we must not lose sight of
implications for overloading users with too much information, which can harm their
learning performance. After a certain point, information overload will occur, which
consequently may prevent users from processing the provided information. This
requires controlling the amount of information shown to users by adapting some
strategies (e.g., filtering and zooming). Some other principles discussed below can
help in this regard as well.
Visualization: Information visualization can facilitate exploring and understanding
rich information at a glance to attract users’ interest and motivate them to learn,
so it has been advocated by researcher over textual contents for superior learning
outcome [127]. Most PPCs already support some level of visualization, however, this
needs further strengthening in PSV as there will be more PIUs and more interactions
with users. One focus will be to minimize possible distractions caused by too many
PIUs and visualization itself.
Segmentation and contiguity: Both principles can help to manage information
being presented by reducing its complexity, thus helping users to understand the
information better. Segmentation is about breaking information into small chunks
[127]. This may involve grouping related information into different units. Contiguity
is about keeping related information near to each other to maintain a smoother
information flow, which can help users to achieve a better comprehension of the
information presented [127]. For PSV, the segmentation principle is naturally done
by grouping information into PIUs. We will need to consider how to map each PIU
to visual features such as shape, size, orientation, etc. Figure 4.1 shows two examples
of how the combination of shapes and orientations can be used to map various PIUs.
The contiguity principle can be applied by providing more detailed information
about each PIU (e.g., using a pop-up tooltip) while the user is interacting with the
PIU. The additional information should be placed close to the PIU of interest so the
information contiguity is maintained.
Signaling: This principle is about drawing users’ attention to significant information
only if it is necessary, which can help enhance users’ learning performance [127].
For PSV, different visual features can be used to signal important information in
each PIU. Information can be signaled by many distinct visual features (e.g., more
prominent color, unique shape, larger size, animation, change of styles, etc.). For
example, different icons or shapes can be used to indicate different information
categories of a PIU, and a PIU’s location relative to a reference can signal a specific
level of risk. Such signaling can help users to recognize important information more
quickly. Another example is about using animation: a PIU can move smoothly from
an old location to a new one once its risk level changes. This interactive visualization
could help raise users’ awareness on such risk changes w.r.t. any changes to the
62
password being evaluated, thus achieving a better understanding of how password
security risks are estimated and why.
Interactive and immediate feedback: It is known that providing interactive
and immediate feedback to users can foster their learning performance [125, 127].
Immediate feedback can help to engage users via giving them a quick chance to
reflect on what they just learned [127], and interactivity would allow users to absorb
complex concepts and enjoy the learning process more. All PPCs have this principle
built-in since the password strength estimate is always updated immediately when
any change to the current password is made. For PSV, we can provide users with
more interactive and immediate feedback by drawing users’ attention to important
security issues beyond the password strength estimate. For example, the interactive
fear appeal idea proposed in [84] can be used to warn users about potential risk
of password attacks immediately after a weak password is detected against some
specific attacks. The risk level can be visualized by a number of “negative” icons
such as skulls to achieve the fear appeal effect.
Reconfigurability and personalization: Further information enrichments are
also obtainable from allowing the system to be easily reconfigured. Such reconfig-
uration can allow users to create a personalized space to enhance their learning
experience and gain more relevant knowledge [126]. As far as we know, all existing
PPCs are designed to offer the same information to all users, which cannot adapt
to different users’ needs. To support reconfigurability and personalization, special
UI elements and lower-level programming interfaces should be introduced in PSV
to allow easy addition and removal of PIUs and other supporting components (e.g.
PPCs, PSMs, password dictionaries and personal information), and also easy modifi-
cation of the behavior and look of each PIU and any supporting algorithm. Different
levels of reconfigurability and personalization can be supported, ranging from sim-
ple information filtering to customization of how an individual PIU or component
looks/works and to even completely change the look or working mechanism of the
whole system.
Portability: This principle is about the need to make a system more available when
users are moving across devices and platforms. An installation-free system that can
run cross different platforms will be ideal. For PSV, a natural choice is to implement
it as a web-based system based on pure client-side technologies (HTML, CSS and
JavaScript) so that any computing device and OS with a standard-compliant web
browser can allow the user to use PSV. The other choice is to implement the PSV
as a mobile app.
4.2.2 Two Example Designs
Following all the design principles discussed above, we can have many different
designs of PSV. To accommodate more information and enrich interactions with
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Figure 4.1: Two example designs of PSV on a 2-D canvas, which is divided into (a)
horizontal bars and (b) concentric circles representing different levels of security risk.
users, it is necessary to move from the simple 1-D bar based design of most PPCs
to a large space for visualization. In other words, we need to use a 2-D or a 3-D
space to show a number of visualized PIUs. The space should have a layout easy for
reconfiguration and personalization. To balance informativeness and information
overload, the information shown in PSV can be put into several layers and visual
metaphors can be used to invite users to interact with each PIU to get more detailed
information related to the PIU. Since working with a 2-D space is easier and requires
less computation, we decided to adhere to 2-D designs but will consider extensions
to 3-D spaces in future.
Two example designs of PSV on a 2-D canvas are shown in Figure 4.1. In both
designs, the following groups of PIUs are included: 1) a number of PPCs showing the
overall strength of the current password; 2) a number of PIUs showing basic password
attributes (PA); 3) a number of weak passwords closer to the current password.
Each weak password is visualized as an icon with a negative meaning following the
fear appeal concept (e.g. a skull) and located at a position proportional to the edit
distance (ED) [128] between the weak password and the current password. The
number of weak passwords around the current password can be used as a proxy of
the level of risk against dictionary-based attacks: the closer a dictionary entry to the
current password and the more such entries are around, the more risky the current
password is. The edit distance between a weak password and the current password
can be related to a hybrid password attack which combines a dictionary-based attack
with a simple brute force up to a number of character changes. The whole canvas
can be extended to accommodate more PIUs easily, and removing or relocating
existing PIUs is easy as well.
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4.2.3 Supporting Algorithms
Different PIUs in PSV require a range of supporting algorithms which include at
least the following groups.
PSMs: PSV can include a number of PPCs as PIUs and as mentioned before each
PPC needs to work with one or more PSMs.
Password dictionary handling algorithms: PSV will support dictionary-based
attacks so some algorithms will be needed to read and search in one or more
dictionaries. A trie-based data structure can be used to efficiently store dictionaries
and to accelerate the search process. A major subset of algorithms in this group
are for detecting weak passwords with a specific edit distance. In a trie (prefix
tree), each node can represent a possible dictionary entry even if it is not a leaf
node. The complexity of searching for an entry is bounded by O(M), where M is
maximum level of the trie (i.e., the maximum length of all entries). Another subset
of algorithms are for calculating the edit distance between two given strings.
Algorithms linking PSMs with PIUs: For some designs of PSV, the location
of a PPC (as a PIU) is used to signal the password strength estimated (e.g., in the
second design shown in Figure 4.1). In this case, some algorithm will be needed to
translate the password strength estimated to a location in the visualized space.
Algorithms for selecting and positioning of PIUs: Since multiple PIUs are
displayed in a limited space, some algorithms are needed to decide what PIUs to
show (how many) and where. Dynamic adjustment to some PIUs (e.g., reducing
the size of a PIU or rotating it) may also be considered. These algorithms need to
consider prioritization and randomization when not all PIUs can be shown due to
limited space.
Parallelization and pre-computation algorithms: To ensure immediate feed-
back to users, the visualization of all PIUs needs to be fast enough to catch up with
the typing speed of the user, even on relatively less powerful computing devices (e.g.,
smart phones). This requires most time-consuming computation to be done in an
asynchronous manner (e.g., using HTML5 workers and AJAX), and be parallelized
as much as possible. Pre-computation should be included, e.g., when a new character
is added into the current password, each dictionary trie does not need to be searched
from scratch, but from the last visited node.
Algorithms for collecting and handling targeted personal information: It
has been recently shown that personalized password attacks can be very powerful
[12, 13], so it will be important to consider such attacks in PSV. This calls for
algorithms to collect information about the user (with proper permission from the
user) and store such sensitive information properly (e.g., in a privacy-preserving
manner).
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4.3 Our PSV Prototype
We implemented a prototype of the second example design of PSV shown in Fig-
ure 4.1(b). This prototype is developed using pure client-side web technologies
including HTML5, CSS and JavaScript, which makes the prototype highly portable.
We also made a simple interface for the PSV prototype to be incorporated into
password creation/update pages of any HTML5-ready websites. The prototype can
be found online at http://passwords.sccs.surrey.ac.uk/PSV/. In this section,
we describe how we implemented the front-end and back-end parts of the prototype.
4.3.1 Front-end UI
The PSV prototype includes three groups of visual elements: a 2-D canvas, a
configuration panel and a number of PIUs.
2-D canvas and overall look.
A 2-D canvas is used as the container of PIUs. Figure 4.2 shows a screenshot of the
PSV prototype’s canvas whose background is rendered as an active radar with a
rotating beam “scanning” for security concerns constantly (indicating the working
status of PSV). The radar canvas as a visual metaphor matches the cyber security
context well, which was the main reason why we decided to go for the second example
design of PSV. The center of the radar canvas represents the current password and
a number of (three as a default value, which is reconfigured) concentric circles are
drawn to accommodate all PIUs. The three concentric circles allow us to locate
weak passwords with a particular distance with the current password (following
the segmentation principle). Other PIUs (mainly PPCs) are mapped to any point
from the radar center to the largest circle linearly so that the distance to the center
represents the level of risk. A PIU will disappear if the risk is considered lower than
a threshold 2(the value corresponding to the largest circle) so that it is unnecessary
to show it any longer. From a user’s perspective, while he/she is entering a password
the radar canvas is dynamically updated with immediate feedback (via relevant
PIUs), and the task of defining a strong password is to remove as many (ideally all)
PIUs out of the radar so that no risks are visible (i.e., high). When the task is not to
define a password, the user can play with the system by entering different passwords
to learn more about password security. The design allows easy reconfiguration and
personalization as a PIU can be easily added to or removed from the 2-D canvas.
Each PIU’s look and settings can also be configured separately or as a group (e.g.,
one can refine how a PPC is located by introducing a new linear or nonlinear mapping
between the password strength estimate and the distance to the radar center). For
three example passwords, Figure 4.3 shows how the whole PSV’s UI looks like.
2The PSV can be implemented in a way that allows for adjusting the risk threshold according
to users’ preferences. In our implementation, we set the threshold based on the PIUs’ types (see
Section 4.3.2).
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Figure 4.2: The screenshot of an example user registration page of our PSV prototype.
(a) app (b) app1e (c) 46r68ffytd
Figure 4.3: Screenshots when three passwords were being entered into our PSV
prototype.
PIUs.
There are four different types of PIUs we include in our PSV prototype. Password
attributes are not currently included because we found them least useful for user
education purposes. We may add some in future versions.
The first type is the center of the 2-D canvas. As mentioned above, the center
represents the current password. We use a small circle filled with a specific color
to visualize three different states: light blue (normal), red (the password itself is a
weak password), yellow (the password contains at least one weak password segment).
On top of the small circle the current password is shown in clear. We do not hide
the password since PSV is designed as an educational tool. If the PSV is used as a
PPC, the password can be simply removed or asterisks are shown as usual.
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The second type covers PPCs. The current version incorporates four PPCs based
on the common 1-D bar design: a PPC we developed based on the NIST password
entropy [51] as the underlying PSM, the open-source password checker zxcvbn (which
has been deployed by Dropbox) [75]3, the PPCs used by Microsoft and Yahoo! (for
which we implemented our own versions). Note that the four are just used as
examples and more PPCs can be added easily.
The third type covers weak passwords signaling the risks against dictionary-based
attacks. We use a skull icon by following the fear appeal concept used by some
PPCs such as those in [84]. The choice of using skulls for this matter was deter-
mined according to the result of our pilot crowdsourcing studies (see Section 4.4.1).
Our prototype considers three different types of dictionary attacks to detect weak
passwords related to the current password: 1) naive dictionary attack where each
entry is checked as is, 2) smart dictionary attack where some common character
transformation rules are considered, and 3) targeted dictionary attack where the
user’s personal information is used to build a small personalized dictionary. As a
demonstrator, the targeted dictionary attack currently gets the user’s first and last
names by asking them to log into his/her Facebook account via the Facebook API.
This can be extended to cover more personal information such as what was used
in [12,13].
The last type covers tool-tips that are shown, close to the selected PIU, when the user
moves mouse over any PPC or weak password. Such tool-tips provide more detailed
explanation to the corresponding PIU in order to provide more information about the
risks of concern and guidance on how to reduce such risks (see Figure 4.4). A unique
part of the information shown on each tool-tip is about weak password segments,
which are highlighted using different colors so that users are encouraged not to include
any dictionary entries in their passwords. This can educate users about attacks
combining multiple dictionaries. In addition, when a character transformation is
applied to match a dictionary entry, the tool-tip will highlight the transformation to
inform users about the risks of smart dictionary attacks.
Choice of Visual Metaphors: We used different icons to represent dissimilar
factors to differentiate between them easily. Our choice of visual metaphors were
undergone a series of modifications in order to empower interpretation of PIUs. The
final choice of visual metaphors was determined according to our pilot crowdsourcing
studies (see Section 4.4.1). We choose to use icons for differentiating between different
PIUs categories as the use of abstract shapes was founded not a good representative
symbol for PIUs’ based on dictionaries. Some of our participants misunderstood the
shape meaning which is a sign of risk rather than suggestion. Therefore, we decided
to use skulls to represent dictionary-based PIUs except a targeted dictionary, as this
icon is more concise, clear to denote threats, and chosen by most of the participants
3We incorporated an older version of the PPC zxcvbn downloaded from https://github.com/
dropbox/zxcvbn.
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(a) A PPC’s tool-tip (b) A weak password tool-tip
Figure 4.4: Two examples of the PSV notification messages showing different detailed
information about a specific PIU.
in the user studies. However, targeted dictionary based PIUs are denoted by logos
of websites, which are collected from. Password metering algorithms are denoted by
“meter” icons.
Choice of Colors: As signs, colors can be a powerful design aspect, if they are
used effectively. Although a good design of signs may work in the absence of
color, colors can be used to reinforce what we want to convey when we use the
signs. In our design of our PSV, we used different colors to draw users attention
to the risk of password under evaluation as illustrated in Figure 4.3. For example,
red denotes that the chosen password exactly matches a weak password in one or
more dictionaries, yellow denotes a partial match founded in dictionaries for one or
more weak passwords, and blue denotes no match founded in the dictionaries. We
think this information is essential to understand how the use of weak segments will
contribute to password strength.
Configuration panel.
Figure 4.5: The menu bar of our PSV prototype.
Configuration panel.
To support reconfigurability and personalization, we also created a configuration
panel as part of our PSV prototype on the top of the 2-D canvas. The configuration
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(a) Mobile menu
(b) View submenu
(c) Dictionary items
(d) PPC items
Figure 4.6: The mobile menu bar of our PSV prototype
panel has two versions, one is shown in Figure 4.5 for a typical layout on a PC, and
a more mobile-friendly version as shown in Figure 4.6 which breaks down the menu
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items into smaller items. The configuration panel empowers the user to make the
following changes to the behavior and look of the PSV prototype.
Figure 4.7: The density controller of our PSV prototype
Information filtering: The panel provides two ways to filter information shown on the
2-D canvas: a slider enabling dynamic control of the number (i.e., density) of weak
passwords shown on the canvas, and a number of menu items to switch some types
of PIUs on or off which includes indirect control via enabling or disabling existing
password dictionaries and password attacks (see Figure 4.7 and Figures 4.6(c) and
(d)).
Adding new dictionaries: The PSV prototype allows users to add their own dictio-
naries into the system. This include personalized and normal dictionaries through
“Facebook” and “New Dic” menu items, respectively. Normal dictionaries added will
be stored in the system and can be enabled/disabled as built-in dictionaries, while
the personalized dictionary is only accessible in the memory after the user logs into
his/her Facebook account and will be released once he/she logs out.
Figure 4.8: The screenshot of “Facebook” login dialog
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UI for personalized dictionaries.
In terms of personalized dictionaries, users can dynamically build a personalized
dictionary through logging to their Facebook account using our platform (see Fig-
ure 4.8). Facebook is just an example of personal information sources. This will
allow to extract users’ information from their Facebook profiles. Their personalized
information, which are first names and last name in our case, will not be stored
permanently, and it will be deleted once the users logging out from their Facebook
account to maintain their privacy.
Figure 4.9: The screenshot of “New Dic” web page
Adding new dictionaries.
Users can add their own dictionaries not in the PSV prototype. This can be done
through three steps: 1) from the menu, access a built-in tool to convert a new
dictionary into a tier tree (see Figure 4.9); 2) then, they can write few code lines to
add the dictionary in the list of password dictionaries in the menu; 3) reload the
PSV system and enable the new dictionary from the menu to start using it. This
feature can be automated to ease the creation of a new dictionary. However, this is
out of our scope.
4.3.2 Supporting Algorithms
Our PSV prototype is supported by some underlying algorithms (explained later)
for different purposes. The algorithms can be categorized based on five steps of
the whole information processing chain: data storage, creation of candidate PIUs,
positioning of PIUs, selection of PIUs, and visual presentation of selected PIUs.
These steps are explained briefly below.
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Data storage.
Since multiple dictionaries are used in PSV, we need an efficient data structure and
corresponding algorithms for creating and modifying dictionaries in the selected data
structure. For our PSV prototype, we decided to use the succinct trie data structure
implemented by Hanov [129]. A segment of such a trie can be seen in Figure 4.10(a),
where red nodes represent dictionary entries (concatenating all letters from the root
node sequentially). We extended the Hanov’s implementation to cover 128 specified
characters rather than 64, including numbers, all English letters and some basic
symbols. Before building the tire, we deleted all capitalization and spaces from
dictionaries. The PSV will load all of dictionaries when the system loading.
For personalized dictionaries, our PSV prototype currently extracts the user’s first
and last names from his/her Facebook account (after login), which are stored
in the volatile memory and deleted permanently once the user logs out. Again,
using Facebook is an example source of personal information. However, personal
information can be gathered from other sources (other social media accounts or a
local PC). It can be more effective if more personal details are extracted. Even
so, then again, this could raise privacy concerns among users over their personal
information.
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Figure 4.10: The process of searching for weak passwords in a dictionary, where the
password given is “car” and two detected weak passwords are “car” and “carbon”.
Creation of candidate PIUs.
To create candidate PIUs that can be further selected for visualization, some algo-
rithms are needed to produce information needed by all candidate PIUs. Information
needed for the current password PIU is straightforward, so we ignore it here and
focus on other three types of PIUs.
Detection of weak passwords: An algorithm was developed to search through all
enabled dictionaries to detect weak passwords whose edit distance from the current
password is not greater than 3. In our prototype, we used Levenshtein distance as
the edit distance since it is the most common metric used [128]. An example of the
searching process is shown in Figure 4.10. The results are stored as an array in
which each element represent a weak password. We implemented multi-threading
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capability using HTML5 Web workers to improve performance of the searching
process and to avoid blocking the main user interface.
Password strength metering (PSM): To visualize any PPC, the underlying PSM has
to be executed on the current password. For our PSV prototype, there are four
PSMs, which are NIST PSM (see Algorithm 1), YAHOO! PSM (see Algorithm 2),
Microsoft PSM (see Algorithm 3) and zxcvbn PSM (see Algorithm 4), each serving
one PPC. A PSM produces either a numeric value such as an entropy value or an
ordinal value (among three or four different levels) to represent the strength of a
given password.
Algorithm 1 The pseudocode summary of NIST PSM which is recommended in [51]
function NISTPSM(p) . This function takes a password (p) and return the
password entropy (e).
e← 4 + 2× p[2 : 8].length+ 1.5× p[9 : 20].length+ p[21 :].length
if p contains both uppercase letters & non-alphabetic characters then
e← e + 6
return e
Algorithm 2 The pseudocode summary of YAHOO! PSM
function YAHOOPSM(password) . This function takes a password (p) and
return the password strength score (s).
s← 1
if 33 > p.length > 5 then
s← 2
if p contains one type of characters c, where c ∈
{letters, digits, specialcharacters} then
s← 3
else if p contains more than one type of characters c, where c ∈
{letters, digits, specialcharacters} then
s← 4
return s
Algorithm 3 The pseudocode summary of Microsoft PSM
function MicrosoftPSM(password) . This function takes a password (p) and
return the password strength score (s).
if p.length ≤ 7 then
s← 1
else if p.length > 7 & p.length ≤ 12 then
s← 2
else if p.length > 13 then
s← 3
if p contains both uppercase letter & lowercase letter & special characters
& digits then
s← 4
return s
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Algorithm 4 The pseudocode summary of zxcvbn PSM which is in [130]
function zxcvbnPSM(p) . This function takes a password (p) and return the
password entropy (e).
matches← getListOfMatches(p) . Returns a list of all possible patterns
(i.e., English words, common passwords, keyboard patterns, repeated patterns,
sequences, years, and dates)
for i=1 to matches.length do
e← e+ calEntropy(matches[i]) . calEntropy calculates the entropy of
a given matched pattern, considering the pattern type (i.e., common word and
repeated pattern)
return e
Tool-tip generation: For each weak password and PPC PIU, a tool-tip object is also
created to contain more detailed information and guidance to users.
Positioning of PIUs.
One algorithm is needed to map each PIU type to a specific position on the 2-D
canvas. For weak passwords, they can be naturally mapped to one of the three
circles based on their edit distance from the current password. For PPCs, this will
depend on the format of the password strength value: 1) if the underlying PSM
returns an ordinal value then the PPC can be naturally mapped to one of the three
circles as well (outer circles correspond to stronger passwords); 2) if the underlying
PSM returns a numeric value like an entropy then the PPC is linearly or nonlinearly
mapped to a position on a radial line starting from the center of the 2-D canvas,
where the most outer circle will be set to correspond to a specific value considered
as “very strong”.
Selection of PIUs for visualization.
Not all candidate PIUs are actually visualized since the 2-D canvas has a limited
space and when a specific risk drops below a threshold we do not need to show it.
For PPCs and weak passwords, they will disappear if their positions go beyond
the most outer circle. The threshold (the value corresponding to the most outer
circle) is set to 3 for weak password PIUs and PPC PIUs which provide an ordinal
value (password strength score). For PPC PIUs which based on zxcvbn PSM, the
threshold is entropy = 60. However, for PPC PIUs which based on NIST PSM,
the threshold is entropy = 30. Tool-tips are always hidden since showing them will
make the canvas too crowded, instead, one such tool-tip is shown dynamically when
the user moves mouse over a specific PIU. The maximum number of PIUs shown is
automatically calculated based on the size of the canvas. The configuration panel
also allows the user to tailor the number of weak passwords which will also influence
what PIUs are selected.
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Visual presentation of selected PIUs.
Each PIU type needs an algorithm to do the actual visualization. This may involve
re-positioning selected PIUs, e.g., re-distributing all weak passwords with the same
edit distance uniformly on the corresponding circle to make them look better, and
moving some PIUs around to avoid conflicts with one or more neighboring PIUs.
4.4 User Studies
This section presents our conducted user studies for improving and evaluating the
performance of the PSV. First, a pilot study was run to gather feedback about
different design elements of the PSV UI. Next, two user studies were run to evaluate
the performance of PSV used as a PPCs. Finally, semi-structured interviews were
conducted to study the efficacy of PSV on broadening users’ knowledge of password
security, compared with three typical PPCs. All, these user studies were reviewed
by the University of Surrey’s University Ethics Committee (UEC) and favorable
ethics opinions (FEOs) were secured.
4.4.1 Stage 1: Pilot Studies
To confirm the effectiveness of our choice of design, we conducted several pilot
studies. Our initial design was presented at SOUPS 2013 [124] 4.In the initial
design and implementation, we used geometric shapes to represent different types
of PIUs. Circles and squares are used to represent weak passwords obtained from
naive and personal dictionary, receptively. Triangles are used to represent PPCs.
However, the PSV prototype was then shown to a number of people and some of
them misunderstood the meaning of the geometric shapes used as visual metaphors of
weak passwords PIUs. They thought that geometric shapes are a sign of a suggestion
to good passwords. According to this observation, we refined our choice of colors,
which accompanied the weak passwords PIUs, unifying the color of the geometric
shapes to be red.
Later, a crowdsourcing based pilot study was conducted to not only validate users’
interpretation of PIU visual metaphors but also to test the whole system and find an
effective symbol for representing weak passwords. We posted our task to 50 workers
via CrowdFlower platform [121]. 47 workers completed the task and two workers
were excluded as they reported technical problem in the system, so their results are
not trusted. Each worker (participant) was asked to try the PSV and provide us
some simple feedback in a questionnaire.
The questionnaire includes questions to identify participants who faced any technical
problems. The other part of the questionnaires was focused on validating the
4The prior design of PSV is named as Visual Password Checker (VPC). Lately, The VPC name
is changed to more representative name.
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Table 4.1: Summary of users’ responses to “how do they interpret the used symbols
for VPC” and “If they really understood the VPC interface design”.
Icon Interpretation
Do users understand the VPC design?
Total %
Yes % No %
Threats 20 44 6 13 26 58
Suggestion 11 24 7 16 18 40
Others 1 2 0 0 1 2
Total 32 71 13 29 45 100
Table 4.2: Simple statistics of users’ responses to “how do you interpret the used
symbols for VPC” and “what symbol is the best to denote the weak password
security threat”.
Icons Threats % Suggestions % Others % Total %
Skull 14 54 5 28 0 0 19 42
X cross 7 27 8 44 1 100 16 36
Eye 4 15 4 22 0 0 8 18
Question mark 1 4 1 6 0 0 2 4
Total 26 100 18 100 1 0 45 100
geometric shape used as visual metaphors of weak password PIUs. Then, we gave
them four suggestions of icon design (see Figure 4.11) for weak password PIUs. The
feedback received was used to assist our final decision of the icon design.
(a) Eye (b) Question mark (c) Skull (d) X cross
Figure 4.11: The four suggestions of icon design used in the pilot study
Table 4.1 shows how users responded to two main questions the icon representing a
weak password. We found 18 participants (40%) misunderstood the geometric shape
of weak password PIUs which was thought to be a suggestion of “good password”
rather than a risk to avoid as we wanted to communicate. 11 (61%) participants
found the PSV UI design is understandable.
42% of participants found skull icon is the most representative icons to password
security threats (see Table 4.2). The same table shows how different interpretations
of icons may affect users’ decision on which icons are better for representing to a
threat. Among participants who correctly understood the icon as a weak password
threat, the majority (14 out of 26) selected the skull icon as the best, which implies
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this icon is more indicative and less confusing. Among all 18 participants who
misunderstood the icon as a suggestion of ”good password”, 8 selected the ”X cross”
icon as the best, which implies this icon is less indicative as a sign of threat.
4.4.2 User Studies for Performance Evaluation of PSV as a PPC
Initially, we conducted two user studies, one being a lab-based study conducted
at the University of Surrey and the other being a crowd-sourcing based study
using CrowdFlower [121] and Microworkers [131] crowdsourcing service. Lab- and
crowdsourcing-based studies have some essential differences, we designed both studies
following the same procedural steps to make the results out of the studies more
comparable.
Procedure
Both experiments are a between-subjects design. We randomly assigned the partic-
ipants into four groups, where each participant in a given group tested a type of
PPCs including PSV.
To align the UI of our PSV prototype and a three traditional PPCs so that any
differences we observed should be only about the PSV and PPCs themselves, we
designed a uniform login page with four different variants each of which uses a
different password security/checking system. The three traditional PPCs we used
include: 1) zxcvbn – a PPC based on the most common 1-D color bar design and the
widely-used zxcvbn as the underlying PSM [75], 2) PM – the multi-bar based PPC
called “The Password Meter” [85], 3) IFA – the interactive fear appeal based PPC
proposed in [84]. We implemented our own versions of the three PPCs to ensure the
consistent look of the overall login page. Figure 4.12 shows UIs of the three PPCs
we implemented.
33 and 47 participants took part in the lab and crowdsourcing studies, respectively.
We compensated participants around $0.5 to $0.8 for the crowdsourcing based study
and £10 for the lab-based study, respectively.
For each participant, we gained the needed informed consent at the beginning of the
experiments to collect and analyze the passwords they would enter into the tested
PPC in a clear form for research purposes. Then, each participant was asked to do
three tasks that designed to be complete within 20 to 60 minutes.
In the first task, each participant was asked to fill in a pre-study questionnaire
about demographics and previous background knowledge/experience on password
security. In the second task, each participant was asked to do four steps. First,
each participant was asked to create six realistic passwords for websites of distinct
categories with the guidance of a given PPC. Each participant was warned not to
use their real passwords. After each password creation, each participant filled in a
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(a) zxcvbn
(b) PM
(c) IFA
Figure 4.12: The UI screenshots of the three PPCs used in our user study.
questionnaire about their experience in using the given PPC and if they gained new
knowledge about password security. About five minutes later, they were asked to log
into a given web page using the previously created password. Then, they were asked
to answer questions about their ability to recall the correct password. The whole
process was repeated four times for all categories. In the last task, each participant
was asked to fill in a final post-study questionnaire about his/her overall experience
on password creation for all accounts.
Results
We did not explain significant differences among different PPCs which suggests
PSV is not worse than other PPCs so it can be used as a PPC without negatively
influencing users. We did not observe expected positive evidence on PSV being able
to influence users more towards stronger passwords, which may be explained by the
artificial setting of the user studies (lack of ecological validity). Based on the results,
we decided to run another user study based on semi-structured interviews to gain
qualitative evidence from users on educational effects of PSV over other PPCs.
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4.4.3 Semi-structured Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to investigate the efficacy of our PSV
prototype on educating users about password security, compared with the three
traditional PPCs. Our main goal is to demonstrate PSV as a superior tool for
password security education.
Interview Design
Although being an interview type user study, participants needed to give subjective
opinions on password security/checking tools they might not have any prior knowledge
so the user study also involves a short testing session for each tool. We also collected
some basic demographic information about participants at the beginning using a
questionnaire: age, gender and educational background. The whole session was
conducted on a one-to-one basis to avoid interference between participants. The
interviews were audio-recorded for further analysis, which later was deleted after
being transcribed. Each participant spent around an hour to complete the whole
session and was compensated £10 for their time.
In the testing sessions, each participant was asked to play the role of an imaginary
security consultant to examine each of the four tools by doing the following for
no less than 5 minutes: 1) trying a number of passwords given by the researcher
and of their own choice; 2) paying attention on distinct information shown by each
tool; 3) trying to understand the information shown; 4) making notes on different
information shown to prepare for the interview with the researcher. Participants
were encouraged to interact actively with the researcher during the assessment tests
to simulate real-world scenarios where a security consultant will normally interact
with the vendor of a candidate tool to get more information about it. Participants
were offered to have a break between testing sessions, but none opted to have one.
To minimize the bias caused by participants’ own prior experience with any of the
tested tools and to give participants a big picture of what the study is about, the
four tools were introduced to the participants beforehand by the researcher.
The actual interview took place after each participant finished all the four testing
sessions. The researcher asked each participant a number of questions around the four
password security/checking tools to gather his/her subjective opinions on different
aspects of those tools (see Appendix C). When a participant asked for clarification
on any tool, the researcher also provided needed information. Participants were not
told that the PSV tool was developed by us, although at the end of the interview
some asked the researcher if we developed some of the tools.
Participants
We recruited 20 participants using posters and the online research participation
system (SONA) of School of Psychology, University of Surrey. The gender ratio was
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not controlled: we got 14 female and 6 male. The participants were in the age range
of 19 to 45, with a median age of 22. Most participants were students from different
subjects: psychology (25%), business (30%), engineering (25%), and others (15%).
None of them had a strong knowledge on computer science or computer security. 70%
of them are undergraduate students and 25% of them are post-graduate students.
One participant worked in the University of Surrey as an administrative assistant.
Results
PSV as an educational tool: In our interview, we collected information about the
most educative password checkers perceived by participants. We asked them questions
about their newly acquired knowledge after testing the four tools. Figure 4.13 shows
what all participants collectively said about each tool as a word cloud. Many
participants found the zxcvbn PPC is the least educative, while the PSV and the
PM PPC are the most informative ones. All participants reported that they had
gained some new knowledge from PSV and the PM PPC. Many of them found
that the PSV directly highlights distinct strategies used for guessing passwords and
possible inconsistencies among different PPCs, which they found interesting due to
the richer information presented in a visual manner. As a comparison, many felt
that they had learned about more concrete new rules to improve password strength
from the PM PPC.
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Figure 4.13: Mostly highlighted words for the PSV prototype and the three PPCs,
each shown as a word cloud (generated by the online tool WordSift [3]).
At the beginning of the interview, most (18, 90%) participants failed to identify that
the PSV as the most informative password checkers according to their understanding
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of informativity (see Table 4.3). Although they agreed that the PSV could provide
a lot of information but they did not believe such information is all useful, and
the majority felt that the PM PPC is the most informative tool. However, after
explaining different components of the PSV and the PM PPC with greater details
to participants, almost all participants were converted to articulate that the PSV is
the most informative tool. A few participants remained their original opinion that
the PM PPC is the best, based on the argument that their subjective judgments
match the outcomes from the PM PPC better. Note that no participants asked for
more explanation on the zxcvbn and IFA PPCs since they are simpler and more
straightforward.
Table 4.3: Participants’ votes on the most informative tool for password security
education, before and after more details on the PSV and the PM PPC were given.
Password Tool Before After Converted
zxcvbn 0 0 0
IFA 5 0 -5
PM 13 1 -12
PSV 2 19 17
The results on the PM PPC are not totally unexpected since it is indeed the most
informative PPC among the three tested. The results should not be interpreted
negatively against PSV because as a container of PPCs the PM PPC can also be
added to the PSV canvas (which we plan to do in future versions).
We also asked participants which tool (if only one can be selected) they would
recommend to their “customers” (average users, normally not security professionals)
for self-learning password security. 11 participants (55%) preferred the PSV over the
three PPCs, 6 selected the PM PPC, and the remaining 3 selected the IFA PC. None
of the participants recommended the zxcvbn PPC as it does not provide enough
feedback to users. Some participants explained that they did not recommend the
PSV mainly because they felt the PM PPC is easier for average users to understand.
PSV as a PPC: Although our main aim is to measure effectiveness of the PSV as a
password education tool, we also gathered information on to what extent PSV can
be used as a PPC. However, none of the participants considered the PSV a good
PPC. The majority reported that the PSV does not give an overall estimation of
the password strength nor direct instructions for improving the current password.
Yet, they reported the same problems for the zxcvbn PPC. This suggests that the
PSV is probably not worse than the common 1-D bar based PPCs. Note that our
PSV prototype has four such PPCs embedded.
When being asked which PPC is the best, six participants chosen the PM PPC,
arguing that it provides more details about the single password strength estimate
which can help users to trust the PPC more. Three participants chose the IFA PPC,
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based on the argument that it provides straightforward instructions where users
will be able to construct passwords faster. Participants who preferred the IFA PPC
also mentioned that the PM PPC would be their second preferable PPC whose
user-friendliness is considered worse than the IFA PPC.
Participants’ trust on PPCs: We also asked participants to what extent they trust
and rely on PPCs. 12 participants (60%) responded to this question. All except
one responded that they have some level of trust on PPCs. One participant argued
that such trust can be established only with familiar PPCs. One another participant
mentioned he/she always trusts PPCs. Other participants mentioned that they
would ignore a PPC if the PPC’s password strength estimate is higher than their
own subjective judgment. On the other hand, most participants said that they
would make serious efforts to improve their passwords if a PPC gives a rating lower
than their subjective judgment.
4.5 Summary and Future Work
This chapter presents Password Security Visualizer (PSV), a new password security
educational system and a prototype developed based on proactive password checkers.
We conducted a semi-structured interview based on a number of testing sessions
with 20 participants to validate the usefulness of the PSV prototype. The results of
the user study showed that the majority of participants agreed that PSV is the most
educative tools comparing to three traditional types of PPCs and would recommend
it to average users as a self-learning tool on password security. Participants however
were not convinced the PSV is a good alternative PPC considering its lacking an
password strength estimate and direct instructions for improving passwords. More
conversations with participants also revealed that most participants found PPCs
useful but their perceptions vary on what PPC is preferred and when they will follow
the ratings of a PPC.
Participants’ responses revealed that the rich information provided by our PSV
prototype was perceived somewhat negatively especially at the very beginning. Some
participants seemed confused about what to do with so much information since the
PSV does not give them a single piece of information (like what traditional PPCs do)
which they can simply focus on. This negative feeling was significantly reduced after
we provided clearer instructions on how the PSV should be used and highlighted its
conceptual differences from traditional PPCs, thus suggesting that the tool may be
better used with instructors. For self-learning purposes, the PSV can be reconfigured
to adapt the system’s features and its UI to each user’s individual preferences and
needs.
In our future work, we will study how to improve the current designs and implemen-
tation of PSV to make it more useful as both a user education tool and an alternative
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PPC. For instance, we may redesign the PSV so that fewer PIUs are shown to make
the UI less crowded and complicated. Another example is to provide a high-level
always-on tool-tip to give users some “global” guidance on how to improve the
current password, in addition to the individual tool-tips for all individual PIUs. A
third example is about bringing some gamification elements into PSV, e.g., a PSV
game may be developed so that users can challenge each other to create the cleanest
radar canvas in the shortest time.
The user study we conducted involved only three types of PPCs. In future work
we will also consider more other types of PPCs and also other password security
educational tools beyond PPCs. One example is Telepathwords [91], a proactive
weak password predictor which could be an interesting tool for user education as
well.
Going beyond password checking and user education, the visualization of weak
passwords in our PSV prototype can be generalized to visualize a (large) database of
passwords seen from a single password’s point of view. Such password databases can
include leaked password databases, all passwords allowed by a password policy, all
passwords used by an individual user (e.g., those in a personal password manager),
etc. Such a “Passwords Visualizer” can be used by security professional as a visual
tool to study the overall strength of a set of passwords rather than just a single
password. This will be one of our future research directions.
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Chapter 5
Pass∞ (Pass-Infinity)
5.1 Introduction
As seen in Chapter 2, there is a need for engaging users to create stronger passwords.
We also saw that some alternative solutions to password are unsuitable to all cases
and have their own limitation. That is why they have not been largely deployed
compared with typical passwords. MFA is a promising technique as it ensures having
a secure authentication. Moreover, there is a growing trend towards MFA in world
markets, especially for online banking [132]. To the best of our knowledge, none of
the MFA schemes offer a flexible and customized design. Thus, users may encounter
usability obstacles in using them [47]. These obstacles may be attributed to their age,
health condition (disability), race, religion, etc. Perhaps the most serious obstacle of
these schemes, from service provider perspectives, is that they are hard to deploy
for three reasons: lack of compatibility, higher cost, and the fear of losing their
customers (if they do not like the provided MFA scheme).
In this chapter, we discuss our proposed solution (Pass∞) to revitalize the current
user authentication schemes with the hope of encouraging users in creating stronger
passwords. Pass∞ is an all in one framework for user authentication that surpasses
passwords and multi-factor authentication. It offers more universal, flexible, re-
configurable, scalable, back-compatible, and user-centric user authentication system
(see Section 5.2 for more details). Thus, Pass∞ provides an exciting opportunity
to enrich password space, enhance usability and user experience, and facilitate its
deployment.
This would throw a question mark over the feasibility of the framework. To answer
this question, a prototype of Pass∞ should be produced and tested on real users to
investigate our posed research questions. One question would be about whether users’
creativity will be stimulated by Pass∞ system to craft more sophisticated but easy
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to remember passwords. We may also ask if the use of Pass∞ enhance users’ security
behavior and/or show a new behavioral pattern which we were not previously aware
of. Hence, a prototype of Pass∞ was implemented. Although the prototype has
not been tested on people, a market research has been conducted by a team at
the University of Surrey who works in partnership with Crossword Cybersecurity
plc to collect potential customer feedback on the technology. Moreover, a patent
application on the Pass∞ has been filed.
In this chapter, the Pass∞ is discussed in more details. Next, the implemented
prototype of the Pass∞ is presented. Then, a discussion of potential user studies on
our prototype. Finally, conclusion and our future work are given, including some
market feedback that collected from the market research.
5.2 A Framework For User Authentication
The notion of Pass∞ is introduced as a framework for authentication which involves
generating data derived from diverse authentication actions, each mapped to an
object of an authentication factor in a common format such as HTML, XML, JSON,
Base64 and/or other binary-to-text schemes. Combination of different encoding
schemes can be also used in representing an object of an authentication factor. The
authentication method also may incorporate hashing the data.
Before explaining the framework in more details, it is necessary to clarify how Pass∞
is different than the current MFA, and explain the possible influence of Pass∞ on
authentication policies.
Pass∞ is similar to MFA only in comprising more than one authentication factor
where users need to comply to be authenticated successfully. However, Pass∞ differs
from MFA solutions in various ways:
• One way is that Pass∞ is more flexible than MFA solutions. Unlike MFA,
it supports free combinations of diverse authentication actions covering all
factors. In other words, Pass∞ allows users to select unlimited type of user
authentication schemes in any order they wish. Moreover, users can still use
one authentication scheme if they want.
• Pass∞ is one-step authentication where all authentication actions are combined
in one data. The authentication process seems to be multi-step authentication
as multiple authentication factors can be used, but in fact, it is not separated
steps since they are all combined to one data, which then will be used for
authentication. This implementation naturally imposes multi-factor authen-
tication in one go. In contrast with Pass∞, all MFA solutions we are aware
of use a number of authentication methods that work independently from
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each other. This is a multi-step authentication where users will be asked to
authenticate them in different step in order to grant access to a system.
• Pass∞ is highly reconfigurable and scalable, compared to MFA. It allows
adding reconfigurable authentication add-ons without changing the existing
system either by server or users. This allows having more control on the system
and adapting new technology while keeping users experience unchanged to
some point.
• Pass∞ can maintain 100% backward compatibility with text-based authenti-
cation method. This is because that the authentication actions are encoded in
a common format, which in this case is based on text, as mentioned before.
This facilitates transferring the original format of all authentication actions
to a compatible format. Thus, users can continue use passwords alone to
authenticate them unlike MFA solutions which require users to satisfy all the
used authentication factors to be verified.
As a consequence of using manifold authentication actions, authentication policies
can be positively influenced by Pass∞. As mentioned in Chapter 2, although strict
password policies can revitalize resistance to guessing, they can grow a sense of
frustration among uses [49]. As policies constrain passwords’ space, attackers may
exploit them to their advantages as shown in [10] making password more predictable.
By Pass∞, more policies can be formulated that keep balance between security and
usability. For example, this can be done by setting high level policies to guarantee
more flexibility and fewer restrictions, which may help in increasing security.
5.2.1 Architecture
Pass∞ can be 100% backward compatible with the existing typical password-based
authentication system. However, this does not mean that Pass∞ has to be built
on top of an authentication baseline, meaning password-based authentication will
be the main add-on authentication. Here, an example of Pass∞ architecture to
show how Pass∞ can be compatible with an existing password based authentication
baseline.
Figure 5.1 shows a Pass∞ architecture where Pass∞ has been built on the top of
an authentication baseline (a text-based authentication system). The baseline’s
components are placed in the green area while the Pass∞ modules are is located in
the yellow area. This shows how baseline components work together independently
from the Pass∞ components to establish basic authentication where password is the
mean of authentication. On the other hand, Pass∞ components enable a reconfig-
urability mechanism allowing flexible integration, segregation, or reconfiguration of
authentication actions without changing the rest of the system.
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The baseline’s components and the Pass∞ modules are further split into two groups:
1) The front-end components which are shown in the left side of the figure; 2) the
back-end components which are shown in the right side of the figure. Both groups
can communicate either over a computer network or on the same computer. If both
components run on the same computer, the front-end components act as a user
interface while the server-side components will be back-end services running from
the same computer. In this case, Pass∞ features and policies can be set by users.
Moreover, the system can be implemented in different ways. For example, it can
be easily be implemented to allow download more Pass∞ modules and policies
(explained later) to expand the system default features. Besides, it can be developed
as a password manager which can be installed on clients’ smart devices (e.g. mobile
phones, tablets, personal computers). The system can be also running within a web
browser.
Figure 5.1: Pass∞ Architecture
Pass∞ architecture is highly adaptive in which whenever we need to consider an
additional type of authentication action (e.g., fingerprint scan), simply an additional
module that allows the new authentication action to be used. Consequently, password
space can be extended as we will have unlimited authentication actions, which can
be integrated and used. However, the functionality of each group is explained below.
Baseline Components
The baseline components comprise three main elements (baseline editor, baseline
module and baseline data) to establish basic authentication. In the client side,
the baseline editor allows users to input their own textual password which will be
then submitted to the baseline module at the server side. The baseline module
consists of functions which are responsible for password verification or/and storage.
This process requires the baseline data in the database to be retrieved, modified or
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inserted. In the case of wanting to change some setting of the module, this can be
done be passing the new setting to the module parameters.
Modular Components
Modular Components comprise three main elements (Pass∞ modules, password
policy controller, new data) to create new credentials. Pass∞ modules consists of
one or more modules. The modules are meant to be independent, reusable and
expandable. Modules can be front-end modules (plug-ins) which would interact with
users to generate a new authentication feature. Some front-end modules will have
a module counterpart at the server-side, especially when establishing a database
connection is required as shown in Figure 5.1. Usually, the communication between
the front-end and back-end modules results in creation of new data or retrieving data
from the database. However, some other back-end modules do not communicate
with the front-end modules and are used to support other back-end modules.
The front-end modules can support one or more authentication actions. For example,
a module can support more than authentication actions by binding multiple different
modules, which are sharing similar features (e.g. graphical passwords). This module
would provide one interface for accessing multiple authentication features, which
may enhance usability.
Password Policy Controller
This special module is responsible on ensuring restrictions on new authentication
actions selected by users. This is vital as this would help define how secure the
generated password is. This module is sat on the client side shown in Figure 5.1,
mainly to avoid unnecessary communication between client and server. However, it
can sit on the server side or it can be split between the server and client. In this case,
additional communication is needed between the server and client. However,policies
should be defined at the server.
Nevertheless, modular components can fit together easily to allow a hybrid user
authentication and policies. Next section describes the authentication phases.
5.2.2 Authentication Phases
Here, we explain how the whole framework components can work together to support
user authentication tasks in real-world applications. The authentication process
consists of registration and login phases.
Registration Phase
Figure 5.2 illustrates eight steps for creating a password P where P is a combination
of one or more generated secrete S.
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Figure 5.2: Registration Phase
• Steps 1-3 involve creating a generated secret from a number of authentication
actions Si. However, not all the steps are necessarily for the whole range of
secrets. Prior to these steps, a user has to generate a secret either via selecting
the baseline editor or a front-end module. The baseline editor enables only
creating a textual password while the Pass∞ modules allow to generate secrets
beyond textual passwords such as a graphical password (See Section 5.2.3).
The generation of these secrets may not require executing any of the first three
steps as they do not need further processing at the server. Otherwise, all the
steps are needed, which are as follows:
– In Step 1, a user makes a request through a Pass∞ module to execute a
back-end modular counterpart to retrieve a specific secret as an example.
– Step 2 may be executed when the back-end modular requires to retrieve
or store data that reside in the database.
– In Step 3, the back-end modular sends a response to users’ request. The
response can be vary based on the request made in Step 1. For example,
the back-end modular will generate a requested secret or modified a
generated secret Si.
– The three steps may be repeated until a new authentication action is
added.
• In Step 4, the created secret from the prior steps will be validated against the
password policy requirements. If the individual authentication action does not
meet the minimum requirements, it will not be allowed to be submitted to the
baseline editor.
• In Step 5, the created secret from the prior steps will be combined to the
former generated password P = (S0, S1, ..., Sn−1, Sn).
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• In Step 6, the created password P is submitted to the server.
• In Step 7, the hashed password will be stored into the baseline database if the
user name is not existed.
• In Step 8, the registration response is sent to the user. With successful
registration, the user will normally be redirected to his account page. Otherwise,
a message of unsuccessful registration will be displayed.
Login Phase:
This requires seven steps as illustrated in Figure 5.3. When a user wants to login
to his account, he can follow the same first three steps in the registration phase
to regenerate his/her own password P¯ and they can be repeated to add a new
authentication action. The fourth step, which is similar to the fifth step in the
registration phase, will combine the new created secret from the steps 1-3 to the
former generated password. This will result in producing password P¯ . In Step 5,
P¯ will be submitted to the server. In the server, the hashed password of P¯ will
be checked against the stored hashed password of P which will be retrieved from
the baseline database in Step 6. If they are equal, the login response in Step 7 will
redirect the user to his account page. Otherwise, an error message will be displayed
to the user.
Figure 5.3: Login Phase
5.2.3 Pass∞ Modules
As noted, users can obtain advanced secrets via Pass∞ modules. Pass∞ will
facilitate the concatenation of a series of generated secrets in a common format to
form a Pass∞ password. In this case, Pass∞ modules may include authentication
actions for uploading files, drawing an image, performing an iris scan, measuring
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keystroke dynamics, performing voice recognition and so on to create the textual
password. These examples are not intended to be limiting. In this section, examples
of authentication actions in different authentication methods are presented, given
details on how they can be encoded into a common format (e.g. string of characters).
What You Know
ObPwd This is another type of authentication scheme where users select an object,
such as a file located in users’ device or on the cloud, to prove their identity [133].
Here the authentication action is the selection of an object. There are different
choices to convert the action to text string. For example, the filename of the selected
object can be used. If the filename is binary, base64 can be applied to convert it to
a textual string. The other option is to use the content of the object to get the text.
In this case, a hashing scheme can be applied to have a shorter length of text.
Draw-a-Secret (DAS) This type of graphical password system is discussed earlier
in Chapter refch:literature. Pass∞ modules would have a module to support DAS.
In this case, the authentication actions will be a number of drawing actions on
an n × n grid. The drawing can be implemented to be done by a pen or a finger
on touch screen or typically by a mouse. As this method would require users to
draw some strokes on an n × n grid, the authentication actions will be a number
of drawing actions, which can be implemented to be done via using a pen, a finger,
or a mouse. However, the actions can be converted into a textual presentation of
different strokes the user draws. For example, the coordinates of two line on the grid
can be used and encoded like “DAS[(2,2),(2,1)],[(4,3),(4,4)]”.
PassPoints This is another example of graphical password which is explained in
Chapter 2. Here, users have to click a number of points on an image as a proof of
identity. The clicked points are the authentication actions.
In PassPoints, the tolerance region of each PassPoint should be considered as
explained in [134]. This would improve the system usability. Typically, the tolerance
region of each PassPoint should be saved in clear at the server. Then, this will be
used later to verify if the clicked PassPoint at the login stage is within the tolerance
of the original clicked point on the registration stage. This means a back-end module
will be required.
However, if PassPoints is considered as a special edition of DAS, there is no need
for a back-end module. In this case, the actions can be converted into a textual
string following the same technique used for DAS. So, the image can be divided into
predefined regions with equal size, forming 2D grid on top of the image. In this
case, when the user selects a point, the point will be the indices of the region which
contains that point.
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Passfaces Passface is also presented in Chapter. 2. Here, users have to recall a
number of face images to be authenticated and then select each image in a number
of decoy images as a proof of identity. In this case, the authentication actions are
images selected by the users. The actions can be converted to a text which includes a
list of the images’ filenames ranked following a particular order. Besides, a back-end
module will be required since all the candidate images should be stored in clear.
Rich Formatted Password A patent paper proposed a rich formatted password
where password tokens and alterations are defined [135]. The tokens can be textual
characters or graphical symbols where their properties(i.e. color, size, and other
styles) can be altered. In this case, the authentication actions are a sequence of
tokens with their alterable attribute. These actions can be converted to text using
encoding schemes like base64, as explain in the patent paper.
What You Have
Tokens can be used for generating digital signature with a private key. In this case,
an initial password (to-be-signed-password) can be signed and then we can use the
output to produce a textual presentation of the digital signature using an encoding
scheme such as base64. The initial password can be a fixed message or/and a part
of the prior generated secrets. According to this, the authentication action is the
use of a specific token for a specific operation.
The token can be hardware device or mobile device. Therefore, the signing process
can be then implemented differently based on how the token can be used. For
example, some tokens with USB interface can be used by attaching them directly to
a USB port. Then, we can use another module to enable the signing process. On
the other hand, some other tokens such as smart cards and tokens without USB
interface require a special reader to use them. In this case, the to-be-signed-password
can be shown in the screen as a visual pattern which afterwards can be read via
an optical/card reader on the token or entered manually on the token. Then, the
brief signature will be shown on the token display (if the token has a screen) which
then users can enter it as part of users’ passwords to finish the signing process.
Otherwise, the short signature can be inserted dynamically to users’ passwords.
Both implementation options can be done using mobile devices.
What You Are
Biometrics characteristics which can be either physical or behavioral can be also
incorporated. Both types would require different sensors to capture their features.
In this case, the authentication action is the captured biometrics data. As shown
in Chapter 2, biometrics data needs to be handled separately (feature extraction)
before merging them to the longer password. For some biometrics techniques such
93
as keystroke and face recognition, this process would involve using machine learning
algorithms to learn users’ behavioral or physical features and next identify them.
Possibly, there are simpler ways to handle this biometrics information without being
stored at a server that then may add another layer of protection to biometrics data.
A technique called biometric key generation [136] can allow the production of a
binary key out of a biometric template which thin can be encoded to text.
Besides, Fuzzy extractor [137] can be another possible approach for generating a key
from biometric information and other noisy data. Mainly, the key is a uniformly
random string that can be reliably reproduced from other similar biometrics. The
reproduction of this key might require using a helper string which normally is
produced by the fuzzy extractor in the first use. This string can be publicly saved
without degrading the security of the key.
Perhaps, perceptual hashing [138] can be also used to simulate a pseudo-classification
process for biometrics information at the client side. Perceptual hash algorithms allow
to produce district multimedia fingerprints, which are not unique but comparable.
Unlike cryptographic hash functions, perceptual hashes are not affected by the small
changes in their contents but they are relative if they have similar features. This
process would involve extracting a number of features that can be consistent or
normalized to produce close results. To the best of our knowledge, this method is
commonly used in the filed of digital watermarking and forensic, but it has not been
used in biometrics context.
Where You Are
Context-based authentication schemes such as Geo-location, login history, access
time, device type can be also integrated. This can be either used as part of the
password or used to deny user’s proceeding through the authentication process. Here
the authentication action is the captured passive or active contextual information
(see Chapter 2). The action can be converted into a textual string based on the
captured information. For example, if it is biometric data, then we should follow
the method (explained above) to encode it to text.
5.2.4 Discussion
In this section, the discussion points to several promising solutions offered by Pass∞
framework. As mentioned previously, Pass∞ allows a free combination of user
authentication actions covering the four authentication factors without any or slight
changes in the baseline textual-based authentication system. Hence, Pass∞ is far
superior to other authentication schemes. This can be explained in five points which
as follows:
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• Pass∞ can be used like the typical textual password system. Thus, it offers a
consistent and intuitive user experience. In the meanwhile, the adoption of the
enhanced user interface by users becomes less problematic as they can still use
the traditional textual-based authenticate as normal. This might benefit all
people, especially those who might resist any new nature, to adapt the system
gradually.
• Pass∞ can convert almost any user authentication method to a password
system. This means more variety of passwords and policies can be used. This
might reduce users’ frustration that can be resulted from enforcing users to
use a particular authentication system. Hence, this may lead to engage users
to create a stronger password.
• Pass∞ can combine unlimited user authentication methods to one password.
This would give users the freedom to control the level of strength they want
to reach from a particular account (i.e creating a very strong password for
banking accounts and a very weak password for gaming accounts). Besides,
this may make them creative in creating similar but unpredictable passwords
across accounts.
• Pass∞ can alert a shorter memorable sequence of authentication actions to
a very long and hard to crack password. Potentially, this might make much
better balance between security and usability than any other existing system.
In terms of security, allowing different combination of authentication factors
would increase password space. Besides, users can take an advantage from
such a system to create more complex passwords. In terms of usability, users
can visually create short passwords that can be memorable but in practical,
they are longer and complex.
• Pass∞ can be implemented differently to support service providers and users,
motivating them to adapt the system.
In general, both companies and customers can benefit from Pass∞ in different
ways. For companies, Pass∞ will allow conservative companies such as banks, which
use textual-based authentication technique to easily adapt new user authentication
environment without carrying a risk of failure or financial loss for their businesses.
Thus, they can improve their services by adapting a Pass∞ system to benefit their
clients as a low potential loss would be expected from adapting it.
In terms of customers, users can adapt Pass∞ for any traditional text-based authen-
tication schemes in two way. First, the framework is a server independent where it
can be implemented either on the server or the client side. In this case, Pass∞ can
be used as an advanced password manager if it is developed on the client side. This
allows users to generate hybrid passwords for their accounts without the service
providers intervention. The user interaction with this advanced password manager
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can be also friendly and similar to how they interact with the traditional password
managers. This means that the password manager can generate a random password
with more sophisticated policy configuration without any interaction with users.
However, users may need to interact with the system if their password consists of
biometrics or tokens. Nevertheless, Pass∞ can be developed at the server side in
which users can enrich the modality of Pass∞.
5.3 Pass∞ Prototype
This section presents the design and implementation of a simple Pass∞ prototype to
prove the concept. Although the Pass∞ authentication scheme is designed on web
application, the design still can be used on mobile devices. HTML5, CSS, JavaScript,
PHP web languages were used in our implementation of the prototype.
Nevertheless, the Pass∞ prototype components are split into client modules and
server modules. We also used some open source libraries to reduce the implementation
time. Indeed, Tank Auth authentication library [139] based on PHP was used to
implement our baseline textual password authentication system while CKEditor [140]
which is a rich-text editor built on JavaScript/iQuery library was used to implement
Pass∞ modules.
Figure 5.4: Snap shot of the password input controller in the Pass∞ prototype
Figure 5.4 shows the user interface of our prototype. The basic password input field
is the more powerful CKEditor (enhanced with some Pass∞ modules) to provide
users with powerful tools and more advanced authentication features. These new
authentication actions will be simply encoded to semi-HTML code by the editor,
which in turn will form part of user password.
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Ten Pass∞ modules were implemented each supports a number of different authenti-
cation actions, covering some knowledge-based authentication schemes. Here, these
modules are listed as follows:
• Eight style modules were implemented to support alert a text format (eg.
bold, italic, underlined, superscript, subscript, strikethrough, text color, text
background color). This can be applied on the whole generated text or on part
of it.
• An image module was implemented to support creating a graphical password,
such as PassPoints and DAS, and an object password which supports only
images. The graphical module is explained in more details later.
• An equation password was implemented to support adding mathematical
equations.
5.3.1 Equation Module
By this module, a user can use the equation editor to define equations such as shown
in Figure 5.5. Figure 5.6 illustrates how this defined equation password can be
encoded and shown to the user. Perhaps, this may benefit users who are familiar
with math or latex to create something strong but memorable.
Figure 5.5: Screen shot of the equation editor
5.3.2 Image Module
In this module, some graphical passwords are grouped into one user interface because
they are sharing the same functionality. Indeed, creating graphical passwords always
requires finding an image in the first step which is mostly similar in for the whole
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(a) Displyed password
(b) Semi-HTML encoded password
Figure 5.6: Example of an equation password created by Pass∞ prototype
graphical based techniques. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show how distinctive graphical based
authentication mechanisms can be combined in a user friendly way for increasing
the system usability. In terms of image searching, Figure 5.7 illustrates different
ways to find an image either via URLs or tags/keywords. For URL images, users
require to type the URL image which may not be corresponding to a real image.
Then, the image will be shown to the user unless the URL is broken. However,
users can retrieve a set of random images corresponding to a request tag/keyword.
These images either have been tagged by users (see Section 5.3.3) or system. Users
have the choice to search images in our database server or search images on the
open Internet. For online images, Microsoft’s Bing Search API is used as the search
engine.
The image searching will be followed by image selection. If it is a URL image,
users can directly add it to their longer password. In the other cases, users will
determine which image they want to use by double clicking an image. This will
result in showing another dialog where users can confirm their selection to create a
simple graphical password. Otherwise, the dialog allows for specifying more features
to create a more complex graphical password if they want which are as follows:
• PassPoints: PassPoints were supported into two different ways which have
been discussed previously in Section 5.2.3. In both ways, users are allowed to
click anywhere on the image to define a set of points (see Figure 5.8 (c)).
However, the traditional implementation of PassPoints incorporates the use
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5.7: Screen shots of the image module. Subfigures (a) and (b) illustrate
different ways of finding an image either searching by tags or by URLs. Subfigure
(c) shows flexibility on finding more images which are either available online or in
the system database.
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(a) Image only (b) DAS
(c) PassPoints
Figure 5.8: Different types of graphical schemes
of Centered Discretization method in [134] to calculate the tolerance region
around each click-point. This method would provide centered-tolerance in
which a click-point should fall within the tolerance region of the initial click-
point. This enables determining an approximate click-point without the need
to clearly store the exact coordinate of a click-point, which improves usability
without negatively affecting security.
The implementation of Centered Discretization method can be achieved by
getting a click point coordinates (x, y). Then, each coordinate value p should
be discretized along its related axis. In this case, the lines along x-axis and
y-axis will be discretized individually into equal segments, where a particular
point (p) lies on the center of the segment containing it. However, the first
segment in each line may require to be offset from the origin to define the
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distance between the original click-point and the left boundary of the first
segment.
Nevertheless, the combination of segments along both axes will produce a
grid. The grid identifier is a combination of the two offsets (dx, dy), each cor-
responding to an axis. Besides, the click point (x, y) will have a corresponding
grid-square (tolerance-square) index (ix, iy). The size of the grid-square is
2r × 2r where the tolerance r can be set according to user preference (in our
case r = 8 pixels).
Given the above information, the computation of the offset d, where 0 6 d < 2r,
and segment index i for a coordinate value p, where p ∈ (x, y),are as follows:
d = (p− r)mod 2r (5.1)
i = |(p− r)÷ 2r| (5.2)
Assume that we have n click-points (p1, ..., pn). To get the password, we can
apply the above computation on each click point coordinates (xj , yj), where
1 6 j 6 n. For each click point, we will get its associated grid identifier (dx, dy)
and grid index (ix, iy). All the grid identifiers (dx1, dy1, ...., dxn, dyn) then will
be stored in clear to be used later in the verification stage to retrieve the grid
indexes of the re-entered click points. However, all the grid indexes should be
securely stored by hashing it with the grid identifier and used as a password.
So, the hash value will be h(dx1, dy1, ix1, iy1, ..., dxn, dyn, ixn, iyn).
In the verification stage, the re-entered click-points (p¯1, ..., p¯n) should be within
the tolerance of the origin points (p1, ..., pn) to be acceptable. Given the pre-
stored grid identifiers and the re-entered click-points coordinates, we can
compute the segment index i¯ for a re-entered click point p¯, where p¯ ∈ (x¯, y¯) as
follows:
i¯ = |(p¯− d)÷ 2r| (5.3)
This computation will result in having all the grid indexes of the n re-entered
click points h( ¯ix1, ¯iy1, ..., ¯ixn, ¯iyn). Then, the grid indexes will be also hashed
with the pre-stored grid identifiers. This hash value will be compared against
the stored hashed password to grant an access to the system when they are
identical.
As seen above, this traditional computation of PassPoints would require to store
additional information in clear to determine the validity of a login click-point.
In our prototype, the PassPoints’ computation are done via PassPoints’ module
which works separately from the baseline authentication module, meaning the
baseline authentication module is not modified.
As discussed previously, PassPoints can be implemented in where there are no
needs for such calculation and additional data to be stored. This method is
similar to DAS approach which is explained below. However, it differs in not
allowing users to draw but to click.
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Table 5.1: Examples of hybrid password created by Pass∞ prototype
Displayed Password Semi-HTML Encoded Password
someApplePie someApplePie
some ApplePie
<strong><span style="background-color:#ffd700;">
some</span</strong>Apple<u>Pie</u>
<strong><span style="background-color:#ffd700;">
some<img alt="" class="image_wrapper"
src="images/objects/Emoji%20Objects-214.png"/>
</span></strong><u>Pie</u>
<strong><span style="background-color:#ffd700;">
some</span></strong>
<img alt="[’1 1 0 10 11 0 1 13 15 16 ’]"
class="image_wrapper"
src="images/objects/Emoji%20Objects-214.png"/>
<u>Pie</u>
• DAS: users are allowed to draw a sequence of grid points to create a password.
Unlike PassPoints, the centered discretization is not applied since the image is
divided into an 8x8 grids and the grid index is used to determine the click-point
(see Figure 5.8(b)).
In general, the whole process involves communicating with the database using
Ajax/jQuery implementation for the image searching and/or selection. In addition,
users are allowed to modify the setting of any image already added to the generated
password by double clicking it.
Table 5.1 shows examples of passwords generated by Pass∞ prototype. Each example
shows the look and feel of the password and semi-HTML encoded text for that
password. The first password is typical password. The second password has some
rich text format. The third one is an example of a hybrid password that consist of
a styled password and an image object. The last example one looks similar to the
third one, however, it is more complex as it includes PassPoints.
5.3.3 Tagging Mechanism
Users are allowed to assign personalized tags to a selected image to easily retrieve
it back later when they log in the system. Figure 5.8 (d) shows a tagging field,
highlighted in yellow. Users can use this to assign many tags to an image. The same
tag can be also used to tag many other images.
In terms of online images, tagging them will result in saving these images on our
database server. This will help to not limit users’ choices to our collection of images.
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Perhaps, the most serious disadvantage of tags is homonyms. Some tags may have
more than one meaning. Potentially, this would lead to retrieve all images in relative
to different meanings. Consequently, this would make the process of finding the
targeted image more harder. In this case, it would be important to enable this
feature on the login stage, to allow users to define alternative tags whenever it is
necessary. Consequently, individuals may end up with many tags, causing problem
in remembering them.
It is important to know that these tags are not part of the password in the current
system. In other words, the tags are not linked to users names. However, image
tagging would carry some risk if not properly used by users. For example, there is
no guarantee that users will not use their personal information in image tagging.
Then, this might be used to attacking their accounts.
5.3.4 Policy Controller
However, the addition authentication actions require a new configuration of password
policy rules. Policies’ configurations are supported via a new class “Policy” that
allows IT administrator to easily add a new policy rule at any time. There are
many ways to implement the policy class. In our implementation, the class was
implemented to allow any jQuery selector and regular expressions to be used to
define a new rule. The Policy class object is initiated once the rich password editor
is created.
The policy object takes two parameters: the rich password editor and policy settings.
The policy setting is a data structure of two elements. One element is a string for
defining the message location, and the other one is an object of rules. The key
of each rule, except PassPoint, is a jQuery selector (string) while its value is the
minimum required number or length of the corresponding jQuery selector. The
jQuery selector is used to count the number of HTML element(s) existing in the
password and validate it against the required rule value. However, sometimes we
need special handling to password characters. Hence, regular expressions are allowed
to be added as a rule object to facilitate checking password characters against
different rules. PassPoint key was also implemented to determinate the minimum
number of required PassPoints.
In this case, many different policies can be supported. Hence, a policy can impose a
restriction on the number and/or the type of authentication actions. The following
definition statement of a policy object, as an example, showing how different rules
can be defined.
//definition of a password policy
var policy_object = new Policy(editor,{
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"location":"bottom", \\ message location
"policies": \\ policies rules
{ "text":8,\\ minimum text length is 8
"img":1,\\ minimum one added images
"passpoints":2, \\ minimum two added Passpoints
"[style*=background-color]":1,\\ minimum one text background-color
"regExp":{"[A-Z]":2} \\ minimum two capital letters
}
});
The current implementation allows the validation of password policies to be done on
the client side. It is applied each time a new password feature is added, showing a
feedback massage to users. However, the validation can be implemented to occur
on the server side. In this case, the policy object should be initialized at the server
where in the client side Ajax/jQuery can be used to communicating with the server
to conduct the validation.
Nevertheless, since tags can also may pose a considerable security risk, it is important
to consider tagging policies. Currently, our implementation of policies did not support
this. However, this should be considered in the future development of a Pass∞
system.
5.4 Conclusion and Future Work
5.4.1 Conclusion
This chapter presents Pass∞, a new framework for user authentication that offer user-
centric free combinations of manifold authentication actions by adding reconfigurable
modules without changing the rest of the deployed systems. Unlike other solutions,
Pass∞ is an all-in-one, highly reconfigurable and scalable, back-compatible, and
user-friendly user authentication framework. Pass∞ provides an exciting opportunity
to enrich password space, enhance usability and user experience, and facilitate its
deployment.
We also implemented a web-based prototype of Pass∞. Currently, this work is
patent-pending and a research market has been conducted. We have got a positive
initial feedback from the market. Many people found Pass∞ is of a great value,
especially because of the current difficulty in deploying security while some other
people were conservative.
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5.4.2 Future Work
Our future plan is to implement a mobile Pass∞ prototype and enhance the current
implementation of the prototype to cover more types of factors. The new implemen-
tation may offer resistance to some attacks such as Phishing. It would be interesting
to personalize Pass∞ in which the user interface will be tailored according to a user
cognitive style, as an example. In this case, if users’ cognitive style is an imager,
then the Pass∞ modules that involve visuals will be shown while other modules can
be hidden.
As the use of Pass∞ scheme may have an impact on users’ behaviors, it would be
interesting to gain some understanding about the type and degree of effect. This
would require conducting several user studies which would include observing user
behavior and perception to evaluate the system effectiveness. Potentially, conducting
some user studies would take a long-term time frame. This is because some users’
attitude towards passwords may not be easily captured within short user studies.
Here, several research questions are formulated and for each question, we proposed
a user study to answer it.
Many research questions can raise on the feasibility of the pass∞ prototype. One
of the questions is about whether users’ creativity can be be catalyzed by Pass∞
system to generate hybrid passwords which can be remembered. This may lead to
ask another question about the extent to which user behaviors in managing and
reusing password is changed. Does the use of Pass∞ system encourage them to stop
their poor security practices? Moreover, we may ask about the different strategies
that can be adapted by users to balance between security and usability.
Another question can be asked is whether the use of Pass∞ shows a new behavioral
pattern which we were not previously aware of. This can be split into three sub
questions: 1) do users adapt the new Pass∞ naturally without being motivated? 2)
do password policies encourage security behaviors without reducing the memorability
of Password created by Pass∞ scheme? 3) Does image tagging pose security risk?
To answers these question, we can run several user studies. One study example
can focus on cracking passwords collected from users. The users can be randomly
assigned into tow groups. One group will be asked to create a number of strong
passwords which they can remember. The other group will be asked to create hybrid
password using Pass∞ system. These password will be hashed. This will help us to
examine the security of passwords created by Pass∞.
Another example of user study can focus on collecting information about users’
willingness to use Pass∞ schemes and their natural understandability of the system
user interface without being promoted. This can be conducted on the crowd. Each
participant will be asked to create a set of passwords using our scheme and then
fill a questionnaire to provide us with their demographic information in addition to
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their opinion on the usefulness of the proposed scheme. We aim also to collect their
created passwords to analyze the security level of their created passwords.
One more example is a lab based study. In this study, we can observe users’ behaviors
in creating and managing their passwords. Firstly, we will collect basic demographic
information about participants and a brief overview of their current password creation
and management practices. Next, they will be asked to register an account using
the Pass∞ scheme. Then, we will invite them to log into the system three times
within three weeks. The participants will be allowed to change their password at
anytime. After the three weeks, we will give them a post-questionnaire to provide
more information about whether they adopt new password creation and management
practices after using the Pass∞ schemes.
Moreover, a between subject user study can be conducted to study the effect of
policies on password security and memorability. Participants will be divided into
groups; each group allows to create account using Pass∞ scheme under given
(predefined) password policy rules (i.e., creating hybrid password using different
Pass∞ modules). Participants will then be invited to log in to their accounts more
than three times within a month. This will be followed by a survey to collect
information on password handling and memorability in addition to participants’
thoughts about the new given policies.
We can also conduct a semi-structured interview with a group of security experts
to evaluate the visibility of Pass∞ scheme comparing to other MFA schemes. The
participants will be allowed to test the Pass∞ scheme.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, the personalization and contextualization concept has been used to
find a better supportive solution where users’ password-security behaviors can be
promoted.
At the start of this work, a background review was given to gain better understanding
of the current issues on passwords and research efforts towards solving these issues
(Chapter 2). I found that there is no an ideal alternative solution to passwords
for all situations and scenarios. There is also an obvious lack of consideration to
human differences in the existing solutions (i.e., authentication schemes and proactive
password checkers). This may cause an unnecessary negative effect on users’ security
attitude and behavior which can be avoided by giving a careful consideration to
human differences in the design and development of a new approach.
In addition, I also discussed the role of password cracking techniques in improving
the evaluation of password strength (PSMs). However, there is still a gap between
the existing PSMs and practical password attacks. Moreover, although imposing
higher restriction on password selection can increase the strength of passwords, the
same restriction can be exploited by attackers for their advantages. In other words,
password policy can be used by attackers to limit the password distribution which
increasing the password vulnerability to attack. All of those consideration show the
difficulty and complexity of password strength evaluation.
To better understand users, users’ trust in the subjective and objective ratings of
password strength was studied (Chapter 3). Our work compares users’ trust of
password ratings given by two rating sources (PPCs and human password experts)
thus providing an original contribution to the literature, in particular with respect
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to Ur et. al.’s work [86]. However, there are some overlapping results in both works
in terms of the influence of users’ subjective judgment on users’ behavior.
Our findings show that users’ trust in subjective and objective ratings of password
strength is heavily influenced by users’ own subjective judgments. The results
indicated that user decision could be also influenced by other factors. Some factors
are attributed to users’ previous background knowledge as our findings show that
users behave differently for different passwords. Nevertheless, some other factors
are attributed to the given context or environment since we found that there are
different behavioral patterns which can strongly influence users’ decisions.
Given the observation that a significant number of participants chose to trust
objective ratings only, PPCs which provide objective rating still are useful to support
users’ decision on password strength especially if there is a lack of knowledge. On the
other hand, our work could also provide useful insights for the design and deployment
of PPCs to benefit users who have less trust in objective ratings. This work also
can be a proof that human differences have an effect on decision, motivating us to
build better password security visualizer (PSV) and more personalized and universal
authentication solutions to improve security.
Moving towards building better password security visualizer, we proposed Password
Security Visualizer (PSV) (Chapter 4), an interactive visualization system specifically
designed for password security education. PSV can be seen as a reconfigurable “box”
containing different proactive password checkers (PPCs) and visualizers of password
security information, allowing it to be used like a many-in-one or “hybrid” PPC.
PSV can provide many new features that do not exist in traditional PPCs. One
important feature is that PSV can be tailored to satisfy user demand. Thus, PSV
can have a greater potential to achieve its goals of educating users. In other words,
PSV aims to make users become aware of divers aspects related to password security
by supporting users with rich information on the security of password of their choice
via an open interface.
Using purely client-side Web-based technologies, we developed a prototype of PSV as
an open-source software tool on a 2-D animated canvas. Through a semi-structured
interview based on a number of testing sessions with 20 participants, the usefulness
of the PSV prototype was evaluated against three traditional types of PPCs. Our
qualitative analysis of the results showed that the majority of participants agreed
on that PSV is the most educative tools and would recommend it to average users
as a self-learning tool on password security. However, PSV was discovered to be not
a good alternative to a PPC because there is a lack of a direct password strength
estimation and straightforward instructions for improving passwords. Results on
users’ perception were also highlighted in this study. The result revealed that most
participants found PPCs useful, but their perceptions vary on what PPC is preferred
and when they will follow the ratings of a PPC. To the best of our knowledge, PSV
is the first system combining different PPCs together for user education, and the
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user study is the first of this kind on comparing educational effectiveness of different
PPCs (and PPC-like password security tools such as PSV).
In Chapter 5, we discussed Pass∞ which is an all-in-one, highly reconfigurable,
scalable, back-compatible, user-friendly user authentication framework. We tried here
to revitalize the current user authentication schemes with the hope of encouraging
users in creating stronger passwords. As users security behaviors can be affected
by human differences, Pass∞ considers such differences by allowing user-driven
free combinations of different unlimited user authentication schemes covering all
four authentication factors. In other words, Pass∞ was proposed to empower users
and/or service providers to adapt more personalized and universal authentication
solutions to enhance password security. In terms of service providers which already
support traditional textual password-based user authentication, adapting Pass∞
will not require any or minimum changes to the server side. In addition, Pass∞
enables much more complex but also more flexible password policies.
We also provided a discussion on how the main four authentication factors can be
supported without changing their traditional textual password-based user authenti-
cation systems. This high compatibility will facilitate the deployment of the solution
by service providers. Users also cannot be limited by the authentication solutions
provided by server providers. This is because Pass∞ can be used as password
manager. An implementation of Pass∞ prototype and a number of future user
studies are also presented.
6.2 Future Work
This section outline some future research directions we plan to look at in the area of
user authentication.
6.2.1 Password Strength Metering
In Chapter 2, we reviewed the literature to show that measuring password strength is
very complicated. Most of PSM methods provide objective ratings (i.e., APSMs [65]
and PCFG based methods [77], personalized PCFG based methods [14]). Very few
provide ratings related to human perception and behavior (i.e., peer pressure based
ratings [82]). However, Chapter 3 indicates that some people have more trust on
subjective ratings of human experts.
The fact that subjective ratings are trusted more by some human users suggests
incorporating subjective ratings in PPCs can potentially help influence this particular
group of users better than existing methods. Therefore, one potential future research
direction is to design new and improve existing PSMs and PPCs through involving
subjective strength ratings given by human experts. The main research questions
here include how to identify human experts, how to engage them in the process, how
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to properly pool ratings from multiple human experts, and how to show the ratings
so that human users to better influence their behavior towards stronger passwords.
6.2.2 Password Usability Metering
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt to quantitatively measure
the memorability of passwords. To measure security along is not sufficient since the
true problem involves two aspects. Incorporating a memorability measure into PSM
and PPC may help give users a more complete picture of how ”good” a password
is. Quantitative measure of memorizability will require advanced techniques such
as cognitive modeling of the memory processes of human brains. It may also be
obtained in an automated manner following a human-in-the-loop approach, where
each user’s login failure can be pooled as a proxy of how hard a password is recalled.
Memorability of an average user may not be very useful so we need to look at how
to contextualize the measurement for each individual user.
6.2.3 Password Checkers
In Chapter 4, we understand that there are many factors corresponding to password
strength that can be measured. A potential contribution is to find other possible
measurements to help users define a stronger password. It is not necessary to be
directly linked to the created passwords, but it could be linked to the users’ emotions,
intention, gender and age. For instance, one possible measure can be user’s stress.
This can be used to advise users, for example, to create their accounts on another
time as their condition might cause them to create weak passwords, which might
not be rememberable.
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, there have been very limited work on password
checkers for graphical passwords. Therefore, it is an interesting research direction
to study how current PPCs can be generalized to cover different types of graphical
passwords or even those highly hybrid ones supported by our Pass∞ technology.
6.2.4 PSV
For PSV, it can be developed as a security educational game. Both adults and
children can benefit from such a system. It would be also interesting if PSV developed
to analyzing user behavior to provide better service to learning experience. It would
be also good if PSV provides users with real time hacking simulation, where learners
can learn password security by doing.
6.2.5 Password Visualizer
Password visualizer can be another future research direction. In Chapter 4, we
mentioned our intention to generalized PSV prototype to visualize weak passwords
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from a large database of passwords. Such a “Passwords Visualizer” can be used
by security professional as a visual tool to study the overall strength of a set of
passwords rather than just a single password. This will be one of our future research
directions.
6.2.6 Pass∞
In addition to the future enhancement to PSV which is discussed in Chapter 4, this
can be further enhanced to consider hybrid passwords such as those which can be
created by pass∞. Such PSV might include attributes related to the strength of
each secret belonged to graphical or textual passwords. This can be used to not
only visualize the strength of textual password but other types of secrets such as
graphical passwords.
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Appendix A
Users’ Trust in Password
Ratings Questionnaire
Here, we present parts which are related to users’ preception of password ratings
from our questionnaire.
Choose the trusted rating for list of things. Overview This is a study of
the influence of subjective and objective ratings on user decisions. This task has
three sections. In the first section, we will collect your demographic information. In
the next two sections, we will show you different items with their subjective and
objective ratings. For each item, you will be asked to define which rating would you
trust and to give some feedback about the reason behind your decision. Your careful
attention on this task is greatly appreciated!
Duration: No more than 20 minutes.
NOTE: You will get bonus payment if you give us informative feedback.
Please answer the following questions
Demographic Questions
Your Gender (required)
• Female
• Male
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Your Age (required)
• Less than 18
• 18-25
• 26-35
• 36-45
• Over 45
How would you rate your experience with computers? (required)
• very poor
• poor
• ok
• good
• very good
Password Ratings Questions
Instruction Review the rating of given passwords in terms of security. The
passwords may be shown or hidden, where asterisks represent the hidden password.
Choose which rating you would follow to use the password. Notice that the user
rating shows the average strength of the given password estimated by group of
security experts, while the Password Strength Meter shows the average strength
estimated by an algorithm designed by group of security experts Tell us more about
the reason behind your selection decision. In addition, If you choose your own
rating, please give us a rating (very weak, weak, medium, strong, very strong) for
the strength of that password.
******** Password Strength Meter Very Weak
User Rating Weak
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
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• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
******** Password Strength Meter Weak
User Rating Medium
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
******** Password Strength Meter Medium
User Rating Good
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
******** Password Strength Meter Good
User Rating Medium
What rating would you trust?(required)
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• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
******** Password Strength Meter Good
User Rating Very Good
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
Password display condition = Displayed
password Password Strength Meter Very Weak
User Rating Weak
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
• Your own rating
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Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
password1234 Password Strength Meter Weak
User Rating Medium
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
Q2W3E4R5 Password Strength Meter Medium
User Rating Good
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
BankEx02 Password Strength Meter Good
User Rating Medium
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
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• Undecided
• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
R77a@7FW Password Strength Meter Good
User Rating Very Good
What rating would you trust?(required)
• Password Strength Meter
• User Rating
• Undecided
• Your own rating
Why did you choose this rating?(required)
<a list of pre-defined reasons is shown based on the user’s answer to the above
question >
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Predefined Reasons
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Appendix C
Interview Schedule
User study briefing
• Explain the following points:1) the need of some tools to educate “security
consultants”; 2) there are many bespoke tools but we want to look how useful
proactive password checkers are for this purpose; 3) Explain what they are
designed for originally and how they can be used for this educational purpose.
• Ask participant to imagine that he/she was a security consultant and needed
to develop their knowledge to help other people in making better decision on
user authentication. Things they need to know include but are not limited to
different type of attacks on passwords and how to mitigate them in real world
including using password managers to generate random passwords.
• Explain the user study’s objectives is to compare the effectiveness of different
password checkers to educate security consultants and their customers on
password security.
• Ask the participant to assess different password checkers in terms which one
can inform him/her more about password security if only one checker can be
used.
Interview and testing stage
• Show them different password checkers and show them how to use them in
general.
• Give them list of password and ask them to try each password (on the list or
a password of their choice) for all the given password checkers. Write their
notes.
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• Ask if they all give the same reading for the same password and ask if they
can guess the reason behind having such reading.
• Ask which one is more informative and why? And why the others are less
informative?
• Ask what are the good and bad things including the feedback and layout of
each password checker?
• Ask if they can learn new things from the feedback provided by each password
checker and what are they?
• If they answer no, ask them why and try to explain some information that my
not aware of and ask if they think this information is useful to know?
• why they did not get the idea? Is this because the feedback is less readable?
And how to improve it?
• Ask which tool they will use themselves for self-learning purposes and recom-
mend to their customers as educational tools?
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